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PREFACE

On April 1, 1918,

in the midst of a long and bloody

war the British government organized a new military service*
Three years earlier the war had become stalemated in the
trenches of France and successive, mammoth,

grinding battles

had succeeded only in destroying the youth of a generation. Partly in reaction to this trench-bound war of mud and
misery the British turned to a new weapon which fought in
the clean and free environment of the sky.
The new military service was the Royal Air Force.
It combined all existing air units of the Royal Navy and
the British Army into one new force, and made this force an
independent agency of the government.

For the first time,

the skies were formally recognized as an arena for battle,
the airplane was recognized as a weapon which could range
and fight over all of an enemy nation,

and airmen were

acknowledged sole proprietors of a new military force— a
force not tied in any way to traditional roles on the ground
or at sea.

iii

Great Britain was the only combatant in the first
World War to form an independent air force.

Great— and

varied— significance has been attached to this fact.
Advocates have long considered it an essential milestone
in the evolution of air power.
lament the decision."^

Detractors,

However,

still today,

not the decision to form

the separate service, but what lay behind the decision is
the subject of this study.
political and military.
were minor.

There were many reasons, both

Some carried great weight; others

An understanding of these,

I believe,

is as

important to the student of the history of air power as
the theories of Douhet, Mitchell,

or Trenchard.

I acknowledge with gratitude the debt which I owe
to all members of the Department of History of the Univer
sity of Omaha who have guided me.
Dr. A. Stanley Trickett,

My special debt is to

Chairman of the Department, who

has led me to a sense of history and to an understanding
of historiography.

^See, for example, Captain Donald MacIntyre, R. N. ,
(Ret.), "Point of No Return, 11 U. S. Institute of Naval
Proceedings, XIIIC, No. 2, (Feb. 1964), 37ff.
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I wish also to acknowledge the help of Group Captain
John Garden,

Royal Air Force, who was kind enough to criti

cize an early draft of this paper; and,

finally,

I must

extend my thanks to the unsung heroes of every researcher's
battle,

the librarians of the University of Omaha and Offutt

Air Force Base libraries, without whose assistance my
research could not have been completed.

PAUL C. PHILLIPS
Omaha,

Nebraska

November 1965
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CHAPTER I

THE- BEGINNING:

BALLOONS TO AIRPLANES

In the early dawn of July 25,

1909,

a daring French

aviator took to the air from a field at Les Baraques,
Calais.

He was flying a small,

near

frail monoplane of his own

design, powered by a twenty-five horsepower Anzani engine.
When he landed thirty-six minutes later in the Northfall
Meadow by Dover Castle, he had become the first man to fly
across the English channel, had won the prize of a thousand
pounds sterling offered by the Daily M a i l , and had destroyed
the insularity of the British nation.'*'
The French pilot wa~s Louis Bleriot, and his flight
cast a long, but strangely obscure shadow across the course,
of British military history.

The length of the shadow led

directly to the air battle which,

thirty years later, was to

pose for the British nation one of its gravest threats, -and
to provide one of its finest hours.

The obscurity of the

1.
Charles H. Gibbs-Smith, The Aeroplane:
cal Survey of Its Origins and Development (London:
Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, I960), p. 69.

1

An Histori

2

shadow was mirrored in the minds of those military leaders
who,

for many years,

failed to see the importance of the

airplane and how it had destroyed England's traditional first
line of defense,

the sea.

British interest in military aviation can be traced to
1879 when a Balloon School was established at Chatham to
instruct the Royal Engineers in military aeronautics.

This

school was the first attempt in Great Britain to exploit
the air for military purposes.

2

The first battlefield use

of balloons by the Army was in the Sudan in 1885, but the
results were minor in the over-all operation.

3

The next major step forward came during the Aldershot
maneuvers held in 1889.

During the maneuvers,

a late evening

reconnaissance by balloons led to the discovery of vital
intelligence on the movement of opposing troops.
sult,

As a re

a successful night attack was launched and the balloons

2.
Noble Frankland, A Short History of the Royal Air
Force:
Air Ministry Pamphlet 348 (London:
Air Ministry,
1958), p. 3. This school was established almost 100 years
after the first balloon experiments by the MongoIfier br o
thers in France in 1782-83.
The French had pursued military,
uses of balloons and had formed a "Compagnie de Aerostiers"
who were employed against the Austrians in 1794.
See C v FSnowden Gamble, The Air Weapon (3 vols.; London:
Humphrey
Milford, 1931), I, 8-17.
3. J. A. Chamier, The Birth of the Royal Air Force
(London:
Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1943), p. 1.

3

gained new respect.

Following the maneuvers,

formed special air sections.

the Army

4

Balloons were next used in the South African War, but
their efforts did little to change traditional military think
ing as to their value.
the Admiralty were,

Leaders at both the War Office and

in fact,

so opposed to exploiting the

air as a military medium that they refused several oppor
tunities to investigate a new and exciting invent ion of two
American brothers,

the airplane.

5

In 1908, A. V. Roe made the first airplane flight in
England.

However, when he, along with other pioneer airmen,

asked the War Office for financial help to build airplanes,
they were told by Colonel J. E. Seeley,

the assistant to the

Secretary of State for War,

that the Government could not

encourage aviation because,

"we do not consider that aero

planes will be of any possible use for war
Between 1909 and 1911,
Bleriot's flight,

purposes.

and despite the lesson of

British heavier-than-air military aviation

was limited solely to the efforts of individual officers.
These officers flew at their own expense and with little

4(London:

Ibid.
5.
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid. See also Edward Lanchbery, A. V. Roe
The Bodley Head, 1956), p. 91.

4

official encouragement.

Captain Bertram Dickson was the

first British military officer to fly.

He did so in a Henri

Farman machine that had been purchased in France.
he was permitted to fly the airplane,
during British Army maneuvers.

In 1910,

at his own expense,

His appearance led to bitter

protests by Cavalrymen who claimed his only purpose was to
frighten their horses.

When some flights were cancelled

because of adverse weather,

the sceptics used the cancella-

tions to cast doubt on the value of military aviation.
February,

1911,

in spite of the earlier problems,

In

The Balloon
o

School became the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers.
Aviation continued to develop rapidly in Europe
throughout 1911.
to the future,

By November,

the Prime Minister,

looking

asked the standing sub-committee of the Com-,

mittee of Imperial Defence to review the status Qf British
aviation.

The Committee,

under the chairmanship of Lord

Haldane, was asked to consider all aspects of the future
development of aerial navigation for naval and military p u r 
poses.

In addition,

the Committee was to recommend measures

to provide an efficient British air service in coming years.

7.
8.

Chamier, p. 4.
See also Gamble,
Frankland, p. 3.

I, 144.

5

Out of the C o m m ittee's deliberations came a proposal
to remove the air arm from the Royal Engineers and form a
British aeronautical service,

The Committee recommended that

this new service be made up of a Naval Wing,

a Military Wing,

and a Central Flying School for the training of pilots.

It

should,

At

said the Committee,

be called the Flying Corps,

the same time a permanent consultative body,
Air Committee,

to be called the

should be established within the Government to

deal with all aeronautical questions affecting both the
Admiralty and the War Office,

9

The Haldane Committee's recommendations received quick
approval from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet,

The Govern

ment recognized that the ultimate air missions of the Army
and the Navy would be different,

but felt that the separate

Military and Naval Wings would permit proper development for
b o t h services.

On April 13, 1912, a Royal Warrant was granted

constituting the Royal Flying Corps,

and on April 25, the

Committee of Imperial Defence approved a final plan of organ
ization.

The R. F, C. was actually born on May 13, a single

service with separate Naval and Military Wings.

The Naval

....

9.
Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the Air
(6 vols. and appendices; Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 192237), I, 190,

6

W ing was to be serviced and administered by the Admiralty,
the Military Wing by the War Office.

The Flying School was

jointly supported by both organizations»
The strange new stepchild of the proud and distin
guished British military services slipped into the world
almost unnoticed.

To the tradition-minded officers of the

British Army and Royal Navy, who were aware of its coming,
was

it

"just another craze for the shortsighted c r a n k . T h e .

opposition of some military leaders to the extension of war12
fare into a new dimension "amounted almost to m a n i a . "

Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
Nicholson,

The

General Sir William

considered aviation a useless and expensive fad,

while another senior Army officer stated that modern war
was already sufficiently complicated without the addition of
the airplane. 13
ness.

The Army had no monopoly upon shortsighted

Proposals to use airplanes for reconnaissance work for

the fleet were rejected by the Sea Lords at the Admiralty with
little or no consideration. 14

10.
11.

Frankland, p. 4.
Andrew Boyle, Trenchard

(London:

Collins,

1962),

p. 99.
12.
F. H. Sykes, From Many Angles (London:
George C.
Harrap & Company Ltd., 1942), p. 91
13.
I b i d . See also Percy R. C. Groves, Behind the
Smoke Screen (London:
Faber and Faber Ltd., 1934), pp. 109-10.
14.
Murray F. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs:
Fair Play for
Our Airmen (London:
Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1928),
p. x x v i .

7

Despite the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the
traditional military services,

a War Office Committee under

the leadership of Brigadier General David Henderson took con
trol of the nucleus which had grown up under the Royal Engi
neers and began making plans to complete the Royal Flying
Corps,

By June,

1913,

a Military Aeronautics Directorate

was formed in the W a r Office with the Director General
reporting to the Secretary of State for War,
organization now included,

in addition to the Military and

Naval Wings and the Central Flying School,
craft Factory at Farnborough,
Department,

The R. F. C.

the Royal Air

and an Aeronautical Inspection

15

With operational control remaining the responsibility
of the traditional services,
organization was apparent.
Committee,

the need for a coordinating
This organization was the Air

The Committee was formed in July,

1912, with

Colonel Seeley, by this time the Secretary of State for War,
as its chairman.

The vice-chairman was Sir John Jellicoe,

Vice-Admiral and the Second Sea Lord,
Brigadier General David Henderson,

The other members were

the Director of Military

Training at the War Office; Captain Murray F. Sueter of the

15,

Raleigh and Jones,

a

I, 415-16,

8

Royal Navy? Captain G. A. Gallard,

the Director of the Opera

tions Division, War Staff, Admiralty; Captain G. M. Paine,
the Commandant of the Central Flying School; Commander C. R . '
Samson,

Officer Commanding the Naval Wing,

Major F. H. Sykes,

Royal Flying Corps;

Officer Commanding the Military Wing,

Royal Flying Corps; Mervyn O'Gorman,

the Superintendent of

the Royal Aircraft Factory; N. E. Behrens,

representing the

Treasury; and Captain M» P. A. Hankey, member of the Committee
of Imperial Defence, who acted as Secretary.

16

The Committee's primary function was consultative, and
it had great value as a meeting place for the leaders of
British military aviation.

Major problems common to all ele

ments of the Royal Flying Corps could be dealt with by this
body.

However,

could advise,

it had no executive powers,

and while it

all decisions were still made at the Admiralty

or the War Office.17
Plans for the Military Wing called for an organization
of seven airplane squadrons,
aircraft.

There was also to be a kite and airship squadron

and a communications element.

16.
17.

each to be equipped with twelve-

The airship squadron was

Gamble, I, 183, n. 1.
Raleigh and Jones, I, 212.

9

formed first,

at Farnborough.

Next came an airplane squad

ron, also formed at Farnborough,

followed by other airplane

squadrons at Salisbury Plain and at Netheravon.
Major operational emphasis in the Military Wing was
on reconnaissanceo
cipate other,

Only the most visionary airmen could anti

greater,

airplane in war.

and far more significant roles for the

With a European war rapidly approaching,

the Army saw its infant air arm as an extension of the tradi
tional eyes and ears of the Cavalry.

The immediate success

of airplane reconnaissance during Army maneuvers soon proved
it was far. more than an extension of the Cavalry.
logical,

and much more capable,

successor.

It was its

18

Despite these initial successes, however,

appropria

tions for the Royal Flying Corps in 1912 and 1913 amounted to
19
"barely half a million pounds sterling."

The size of this

18.
Chamier, p. 9.
The most notable successes of air
craft in the reconnaissance role came during Army maneuvers
in East Anglia in 1912, and during the "Concentration Camp"
maneuvers at Netheravon in 1914.
At East Anglia, twenty-four
airplanes and one airship flew a total of 7,855 miles scouting
for the Army.
The Director of Military Operations at the War
-Office recognized the contribution of the airplane when he
said:
"There can no longer be any doubt as to the value of
airships and aeroplanes in locating an enemy on land and
obtaining information which could otherwise only be obtained
by force."
Cited in "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 19121962, " a Chronology published by the Air Ministry.
(London:
1962), p. 2.
19.
Boyle, p. 108.

10

sum meant that Henderson could spend no money for research
and development and very little for aircraft procurement.
a result, private manufacturing slumped and,
1913 with the war ever closer,

As

in the spring of

the Military Wing could Rarely

equip one squadron on a combat footing.

20

C. G. Grey,

editor of The Aeroplane magazine was forced to admit in his
end-of-the-year review that "as a whole,
b a d third to France and Germany . . . "

Great Britain is a
in military avia

tion. ^
The Naval Wing's operational mission was much less
well defined.

The new addition to Britain's traditional first

line of defense began life with only twelve aircraft.

No

more were to be purchased until research could prove aircraft
useful as an adjunct to the fleet.

This research program

quickly led to flights from the sea on float-equipped air
craft,

and,

shortly after,

deck of a moving ship.

to the first flights from the

These were made from the battleship

Hibernia, steaming at ten-and-a-half knots.

A Short hiplane,

equipped with a seventy horsepower Gnome engine,
from a platform built over the ship's forecastle.

20.
21.

Ibid.
The Aeroplane, January 1, 1914, p. 3.

took off
The plane

was piloted by Commander C. R. Samson.

22

A Naval aviator

also carried out the first experiment in simulated bombing.
Lieutenant Robert Gregory released a 300-pound weight from
his aircraft and found,

to his great relief,

change the basic stability of the craft.

23

that it did not
The Naval Wing

also began.to reinvestigate the use of airships,

and carried

out the first attempts to communicate between the ground and
an airborne aircraft by means of wireless telegraphy.
During 1912,

the Air Committee decided to build five

stations along the east coast of Scotland and England to be
operated by the Naval Wing.

These stations were for airships

and airplanes working with the Fleet at sea.
Late in 1912,

activities of the Naval Wing were with

drawn from the supervision of the Director of Naval Ordinance,
and an "Air Department" was formed by the Board of Admiralty.
Captain Murray Sueter,
director,

a pioneer aviator, was made its

A weakness which was to have far-reaching results

22.
In December, 1911, Samson, then a Lieutenant,
became the first man to fly from a ship when he took off in
a Short biplane from a plafform built on the deck of the
A f r i c a . The ship was anchored in Sheerness Harbor at the
time.
See Gamble, pp. 159-60.
23.
I bid., pp. 180-81.
24.
I b i d ., p. 183.
Airship development in the Navy
had been halted in 1911 following the disaster of the Mayfly,
a poorly built, rigid airship which was destroyed before her
first flight.

12

was built into the organization at this time when Sueter was
made responsible to all the various Sea Lords for different
parts of his job-

He was required,

for example,

to report

to the First Sea Lord on matters of employment and tactics,
to the Second Sea Lord on personnel and training problems,
and to the Third Sea Lord on questions of supply and materiel.
It was soon apparent that he was required to serve too many
25
masters»
Research and experiments by the Naval airmen con
tinued,

but acceptance of the use of aircraft by the senior

officers of the fleet was virtually non-existent.

The Admir

alty staff thought the airplane had possible future importance,
but little present value for war.
First Sea Lord,

the

foresaw development of aircraft which could

play a defensive role,
enemy airships-

Winston Churchill,

could scout at sea,

and could repel

But the Naval leaders who stood to gain the

most from the new weapon,

the sea force commanders,

almost

to a man refused to recognize its e x i s t e n c e . ^

25.
I b i d ., pp. 201-202.
26.
Criticism of the Admiralty and its shortsighted
air policy was not confined to the years before the war, but
continued throughout the period under study.
Writing in
The Aeroplane on March 13, 1918, C. G. Grey commented:
"Every
one fully recognizes the magnificent work done by units of the
Royal Naval Air Service, especially when they have formed
practically independent commands under young and energetic

13

As the two wings ofv the Royal Flying Corps began to
cautiously advance their military usefulness by small steps
at the cost of experiment and investigation,
diverge in purpose and direction.

they began to

The first major dividing

point was the Royal Aircraft Factory.

This organization,

a

part of the R. F. C ., was charged primarily with performing
experimental work,

the testing of aircraft and engines,

general research into the realm of flight.

27

However,

and .
due

largely to the aggressive leadership of its superintendent, .
Mervyn O'Gorman,
craft.

the factory soon began manufacturing air

When one of these,

the B. E. 2, proved superior to

all others for military purposes during the Military Aero
plane Trials,

the factory and O'Gorman quickly earned the

enmity of the private aircraft builders.

The Military Wing,

equipping its squadrons with the B. E. 2, turned more and
more to the Royal Aircraft Factory for its aircraft.

The

Naval Wing, pursuing a wide range of experimental programs,
relied almost entirely upon private aircraft manufacturers.
This apparent dichotomy was to prove later to be the greatest

officers, but wherever the influence of the Admiralty has
been felt in the past in connection with aviation the effect
has been truly lamentable."
27.
The charter of the Royal Aircraft Factory was
stated in the Royal Warrant of April 13, 1912.

of blessings.

But it was the beginning of a lengthy and

torrid debate which was carried on for years.

28

Only at the Central Flying School on Salisbury Plain
where Navy Captain G. M. Paine commanded,

assisted by Major

Hugh M. Trenchard, was there unity of purpose in the two
different groups which made up the R. F. C.

Paine,

an early

airman who had been released by the Navy to run the school,
drafted Trenchard from the student body to be his assistant.
Trenchard,

a forty-year-old Major, had battled official

Army disapproval of his age as well as his own poor health
to learn to fly.

In drafting him, Paine pointed out that

there were three times as many Army as Navy students in the
school,

and an Army Adjutant was urgently needed.

Trenchard

attached the job with a characteristic firmness of purpose,
adapting the best procedures from the regulations of both
services.

29

Paine and Trenchard worked smoothly together,

28.
Virtually every issue the author examined of
The Aeroplane m agazine covering the years 1914 through 1918
contained an attach on the Royal Aircraft Factory.
These
ranged from innuendoes and sly comments to all-out attacks
and accusations of criminal neglect in connection with air
craft accidents.
The Aeroplane was the principal trade
publication of the time? hence, the attacks must be judged
carefully.
As the issues of C. G. Grey's magazine became
progressively fatter, primarily with the advertisements of
aircraft manufacturers, his attacks on the Royal Aircraft
Factory became more scathing.
29.
Boyle, pp. 96-100.

15

and the school functioned well and produced aviators for both
Wings of the Royal Flying Corps.30
A problem of divided command was inherent in the
original organization of the Royal Flying Corps,

and there

was no force in the early days to hold it together.

The most

important question was whether control of the air service
should be invested in the Air Committee or should remain with
the War Office and the Admiralty.

As we have seen,

the Air

The Admiralty,

holding

Committee had advisory powers only.

operational control, was quick to establish full jurisdiction
over the Naval Wing.

The Haldane Committee's recommendation,

approved by the Cabinet, was that the
Service /should7 . . .
nated

"British Aeronautical

be regarded as one and . . . desig

'The Flying Corps'."

But the Admiralty did not support

,-i . j
. .
31
this decision.
After a few references in official documents to the
"Royal Flying Corps, Naval Wing, " the title was quickly dropped from use,

and the Admiralty began using the title

32
"The Royal Naval Air Service. "

Continued independent

30.
The Navy, however, never ceased training pilots,
at its independent school at Eastchurch.
See W. E. deB.
Whittaker, "The Royal Flying Corps in 1913, " The Aeroplane,
January 1, 1914, p. 13.
31.
Chamier, p. 8.
See also Gamble, I, 266.
32.
Raleigh and Jones# I# 206.

16

action on the part of the Admiralty led,

in July,

1914; to

official recognition of the Royal Naval Air Service as an
independent organization, with

a constitution of its own and

complete jurisdiction over the

separate Naval flying school

at Eastchurch and the air stations on the coast.
made by a government committee,
confirmed by a Royal Warrant,

A decision

approved by the Cabinet and

had been reversed by the uni

lateral action of a powerful and independent Government
department.

As a result,

the fledgling air service approached

the summer of the European war

split into two sickly and

divided forces.

political power of the

"Such was the

A<3miralty.

33.

Gamble,

I, 266.

CHAPTER II

AIR BATTLES AND AIR BOARDS

The Royal Plying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Ser
vice entered the First World War on eager wings,
untried and ill-equipped forces.

but with

The ambitious plans made

in 1912 for a Flying Corps of eight squadrons equipped with
3 00 airplanes and manned by 300 pilots had foundered on the
rocks of government economy.
squadrons,
ized.

Instead of eight full-strength

there were four squadrons,

all still being organ

Less than 100 serviceable aircraft were available,

and considerably fewer than 100 trained and qualified
pilots could be called upon."*'

The Royal Aircraft Factory

was producing about two airplanes per month,

and the produc

tion of private builders was even more limited.

These air

craft were hand-constructed by skilled workmen.

No satis

factory aircraft engine had ever been produced in Britain.

1.
Norman MacMillan, Sir Sefton Brancker (London;
William Heinemann Ltd., 1935), p. 54.
L. G. S. Payne in his
excellent compilation, Air Dates (New York:
Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 20, says that immediately before the
war Britain had 179 aircraft, France had about 1,500, and
Germany had 1,000.
These are total airplanes, not necessarily
military aircraft.
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Nowhere in the country was there the type of manufacturing
experience required to build and supply a combat air force*
As soon as the war beqan,

2

General Henderson left his

post in the Military Aeronautics Directorate of the War
Office and took command of the R. F. C. in the field.

Major

Sykes, who had commanded the Military Wing, became Henderson's
Chief of Staff,

and Major Sefton Brancker was appointed

Henderson's deputy to take charge at home in the Military
Aeronautics Directorate.

Sykes was replaced in the Military

Wing by Major Hugh Trenchard who had been second in command
at the Central Flying School.
Henderson stripped the flying school of aircraft and
pilots and gathered every other airworthy airplane he could
find.

His efforts brought together a force of sixty-three

aircraft which flew the channel to France for duty with the
Army Expeditionary Force.

3

2. MacMillan, Brancker, p. 55.
3. F. H. Sykes, Aviation in Peace and War (London:
Edward Arnold & Co., 1922), p. 45.
Sykes says the home force
was so completely stripped because "we considered it essen
tial to dispatch at once to France every available machine
and pilot, because both political and military authorities
were of the opinion that for economic and financial reasons
a war with a great European power could not last more than
a few m o n t h s ."
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Trenchard and Brancker,

left behind, were faced with

the immediate and very serious problem of finding aircraft
and instructors to train new pilots.,

In addition,

replacement

aircraft and pilots were needed to join the units in France..
The two men made a valiant assault on their supply problems,
using unorthodox methods,

commandeering what they needed,

and continually prodding the Royal Aircraft Factory.

They

began to slowly piece together a training force.
Brancker almost immediately found that he was having
trouble obtaining needed raw materials for the Royal Aircraft
Factory.

The Royal Naval Air Service,

using the vast purchas

ing power of the Admiralty, was rapidly buying up the avail
able supply of many scarce materials for private manufacturers.
Private builders were turning out some good new equipment,
<o

but the Government factory was still the primary supplier
for the R. F. C.

4

The War Office,

falling continually

behind in its own ambitious supply program for the ground
forces, had little concern for the needs of the young flying
corps,

and Brancker was left to battle for the needed mater

ials on his own.

4.

Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London:
Collins, 1962),
p. 13 7.
See also Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the
Air (6 vols. and appendices; Oxford:
The Clarendon Press,
1922-37) I, 169.

Meanwhile,

in France,

first blood on August 25.
Number 2 Squadron,

Henderson's young force drew its

Three unarmed aircraft of the

spotting an opposing German scout,

downed

the enemy airplane by flying round and round above it until
the pilot was forced to land.

5

All activity of the Royal Flying Corps in France was
linked directly to the fluctuating fortunes of the ground
forces.

The Squadrons of the Military Wing were organized

to support the Army, and they immediately began reconnaissance
missions over the rapidly shifting battlefront.^

As the

British Army retreated before the hard-driving German attack,
the Squadrons of the R. F. C. retreated also.

Pilots took

off to fly over the nearby front and returned to find their
operating base being moved rapidly back to a new location.
The broad operational potential of the new weapon was
quickly exploited.

By September,

the pilots of the R. F. C.

were using wireless telegraphy communications to direct
artillery batteries at the battle of the Aisne.

Observers

5.
Payne, p. 20.
6.
The first reconnaissance mission of the war was
flown from Maubeuge on August 19.
Taking part were Captain
P. Joubert de la Ferte of the No. 3 Squadron in a Bleriot,
and Lieutenant G. W.
Mapplebeck of the No. 4 Squadron in a
B. E. 2.
See "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962,"
A Chronology published by the Air Ministry.
(London:
1962),
p. 3.

began talcing photographs of battle lines and enemy f o r t i f i - _
cations,

the beginnings of aerial photography.

September,

Also in

the first Maurice Farman two-seat pusher biplane

equipped with a machine gun arrived in France.

Its appear-,

ance heralded the end of the early cavalier air battles in
which passing pilots fired at each other with their service
p i s t o ls .^
By the end of November,

it was apparent that the

R. F. C. would have to expand to match the growth of the Army
ground force.

On November 29, the original Military Wing

was disbanded and new Wings were formed in France to be
attached to each Army Corps.
Depot,

the Aircraft Park,

The Farnborough Squadrons,

the

and the Record Office at home were

grouped together as the Administrative Wing.^
The untried new force had come through its first
tests with great courage and had begun to forge the tactics
with which to fight this strange type of war.

The Army was

beginning to accept the value of the airplane for artillery .
spotting and for reconnaissance.

The reorganization tied the

air weapon ever closer to the Army and the ground mission.
But thoughtful men were beginning to question if the new
weapon was being well and wisely used.

7.

Ibid.

8.

Ibid.
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As the second year of the war began,

the pilots of the

R. F. C. continued to experiment and develop new tactics.
January,

In

the first Experimental Photographic Section was

formed under Lieutenant J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon.

By March,

this new technology had advanced so quickly that the assault
on Neuve Chapelle was based entirely on maps prepared from
photographic reconnaissance.

g

On March 10, the first interdiction air bombing took
place when R. F. C. aircraft attacked the railways at
Courtrai, Menin,

Lille,

one-hundred pound bombs.

Douai,

and Don with twenty-five and

The objective of the attacks was

to delay the advance of enemy r e i n f o r c e m e n t s . ^
Supply problems,
ammunition,

particularly shortages of shells and

began in early 1915 to plague all the British

military forces.

The R. F. C.,

attempting to organize new

squadrons as rapidly as possible and to simultaneously replace
the combat losses which were growing larger daily, was having
great difficulty.

11

In August,

1915,

Lieutenant Colonel

9. Moore-Brabazon, in his light-hearted autobiography
The Brabazon Story (London:
William Hcinemann Ltd., 1956),
p. 63, claims he was given the responsibility because he was
the only knowledgeable amateur photographer in his squadron.
10.
"Fifty Years of Military Aviation," p. 3.
Inter
diction here is used to describe any attack designed to halt
the movement of supplies or reinforcements to the front lines.
11.
Air Commodore J. A. Chamier, remembering these
days during World War II in The Birth of the Royal Air Force
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Robert Brooke-Popham,
Staff in France,
problem.

who had replaced Sykes as Chief of

wrote a memorandum which surveyed the -entire

He pointed out that while the Army Expeditionary

Force had grown from four divisions to thirty during the
first year of the war, the R« F. C. had increased only from

four squadrons to eleven.

And this, he said, was despite

the air weapon's ever-expanding role.

He wrote:

If the enemy brings troops over from the Eastern front
and resumes his offensive, he will doubtless make a
determined effort to prevent our discovering his m o v e 
ments.
Then will commence the real struggle for air
supremacy where numbers will be one of the essentials
1o
of success.
Something,
Henderson,

obviously,

had to be done.

the R. F. C.'s most senior officer,

On August 19,
selected

Trenchard as his successor and returned to the War Office
to do battle over the problems of men and material for the
expanding air service.
Trenchard's concept of air warfare was to maintain a
constant offensive at all costs.

He believed that only by

(London:
Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1943), p. 63, says:
"The early stages of the war were fought mainly on French
machines and entirely on French engines and German magnetos;
and the R. N. A. S. entered into direct competition with the
R. F. C. for these French supplies.
Not only did friction
arise, but the French themselves were hard put to it to supply
their own requirements.
For example, of 150 LeRhone engines
ordered for the last quarter of 1915, only ten were delivered."
12.
Raleigh and Jones, II, 143.
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continually attacking the opposing forces, maintaining con
stant patrols,

and by operating to the greatest extent p o s 

sible behind the enemy lines could the airplane be an
effective w e a p o n .

He immediately began to instill this

belief in his commanders and in the pilots of the R. F‘. C.
It was the root of his statement on future air policy,
issued from his Advanced Headquarters in France on September
22,

1916.

In it he said:

The sound policy • . • which should guide all warfare
in the air would seem to be this:
to exploit . . •
/ t h e 7 moral£ej effect of the aeroplane on the enemy,
but not to let him exploit it on ourselves.
Now this .
can only be done by attacking and by continuing to
attack. ^

1 3 o The entire statement is published as Appendix IX
of Raleigh and Jones, II, 472-74.
Trenchard's constant
offensive doctrine has been severely criticized by his con
temporaries, writing after the war.
Sykes says*, in From Many
Angles (London:
George G. Harrap & Company Ltd., 1942), p.
220, that "Trenchard had been an exponent of the batteringram tactics beloved by G. H. Q. and kept up a continuous
offensive.
Spectacular dog fights over the German lines
achieved little strategic effect and resulted in grave
l o s ses." Sholto Douglas, who served as a Squadron Commander
in France under Trenchard and later became a senior R. A. F.
Commander, says in Years of Combat (London:
Collins, 1963),
pp. 179-80, that "that magnificent eagerness of Trenc h a r d 1s
to use the air for offence against the enemy led him, quite
unintentionally, to make greater demands on the new pilots
than were justified. . . .
I have always felt that we would
have been much better off if we had had fewer squadrons
manned by pilots who were better trained and who had greater
experience? and quite a few of us who served on the western
front and who were later to become senior commanders of the
Royal Air Force felt the same way about Trenchard's policy

25

T re n c h a r d 's doctrine of the constant offensive placed
new and unprecedented demands upon the young flying service.
Coming,

as it did, with the introduction of a new German

fighter--the Fokker— it brought the R. F. C. to its darkest
hour of the war.

To provide the offensive force needed to

keep up continuous pressure on the Germans,
more and more squadrons.

Trenchard demanded

These demands could only be met by

shortening the training period in England for pilots,

and by

increasing pressure upon the Royal Aircraft Factory to pro
duce more aircraft.

These were the conditions when the

Germans introduced the Fokker to the air battle over the
trenches.

The superiority of this German single-seat fighter

was felt immediately.

It was based on a striking technological

of driving so hard and almost regardless of cost."
Chamier,p. 199, says:
"The doctrine of the offensive, associated
forever with the name of Trenchard, was the correct one from
the point of view of morale as well as of material results,
but an active offensive in the air at all times and places
regardless of need or object was a stupidity for which we
paid dearly in lives."
General Percy R. C. Groves in Behind
the Smoke Screen (London:
Faber and Faber, Limited, 1934),
p. 124, calls the sending of inadequately trained pilots to
the front "the most pitiful of all the hidden scandals of the
war."
Groves maintains that T renchard's offensive policy led
to the sacrifice of untrained pilots, and the excessive
losses of men and aircraft for no significant purpose.
He
says that because of the R. F. C.'s loss rate of three-toone as opposed to the Germans, the shortage of aircraft was
aggravated and the day when they could be used for a
strategic offensive was further delayed.
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development— the ability to fire a machine gun straight for
ward,

through the propellor.

The unhappy combination of the

superior new German fighter and of Trenchard's hurriedly
trained pilots brought soaring casualty rates to the R. F. C.
This situation continued until May,

1916, when the

first group of Sopwith one-and-one-half Strutter two-seat
fighters was sent to F r a n c e /

This high-performance aircraft

was built for the Naval Wing under its policy of encouraging
development by private contractors.

It could fire forward

through the propellor and also from a Lewis gun mounted in
the rear seat.

With its appearance,

the balance was slowly

re-established.^
Trenchard further decentralized the organization of
the R. F. C. in January,
allotted two Wings,

1916, when each Army in France was

organized as an Air Brigade.

One wing

was to carry out routine Army Corps work and the other to

14.
The story of the Fokker ascendancy is, of course,
too large to be more than touched upon in this paper.
Interestingly, Admiral Mark Kerr in his Land, Sea and Air
(London:
Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1927), pp. 180-81,
gives much credit to the individual efforts of the great
war ace, Albert Ball, in countering the morale effects of
the Fokker.
He says:
"Ball, in his old machine, with his
Wonderful genius for flying and straight shooting, proceeded
to change the atmosphere of doubt and fear. . . . He took on
the Fokker singly or in numbers, and shot them down without
fear or favour. . . . Our morale was restored and we held
our position in the air until the advent of our new machines."
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conduct the fighting,

bombing,

and distant reconnaissance.

15

The result was to link the air weapon ever closer to the
ground war.
The

"Fokker scourge" left deep marks on the R. F. C.

The losses in men and aircraft brought increased pressureon the supply and training establishments at home.

The grow

ing casualty lists led to questions in the House of Commons
and to criticism by the press.

The British people wanted to

know why a badly battered R. F. C. was being mauled by a
seemingly superior e n e m y . ^

An investigation was demanded,

and early in 1916 a Committee of Inquiry,

the Bailhache

Committee, was appointed to look into the government's air
policies.
tify.

The Sea Lords at the Admiralty chose not to tes

As a result the investigation concentrated on the

Royal Flying Corps,

ignoring the Royal Naval Air Service

which had followed a far different course through the first
two years of the war.
When the war began in 1914,

the Naval Wing of the

original Royal Flying Corps had split away and had become
the Royal Naval Air Service.

The first wartime move of the

15.
"Fifty Years of Military A v iation," p. 4.
16.
John R. Cuneo, The Air Weapons, 1914-1916, Vol.
II of Winged Mars (Harrisburg:
Military Service Publishing
C o . , 1947), p. 285.

28

R. N. A. S. was to concentrate forces in the area of the Hum
ber and the Thames and from Immingham to Clacton in anticipa
tion of German airship attacks from Belgium.

A coastal patrol

was initiated on August 8 for the whole of the east coast.1^
The key to the early participation of the Royal NavaJ.
Air Service in the war lies in the personality of Winston
Churchill.
Admiralty,

Churchill,

while, serving as First Lord at the

assumed great control over the activities of the

Naval Air Service and developed it along his own unorthodox
but ambitious lines.

1p

Churchill foresaw the demands which would be made upon
the R. F. C. in a European land war and anticipated that .the
role of defending England from air attack would fall to the
Navy by default.

When Henderson took every available air

craft and pilot to France in 1914,

Churchill's Naval airmen

immediately prepared to defend the home island.

This step

was formally recognized at a Cabinet meeting on September 3,
when Lord Kitchener asked Churchill and the Admiralty to
assume responsibility for the air defense of Britain.

19

17.
Raleigh and Jones, I, 360.
18.
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
George (6 vols; Boston:
Little Brown and Company, 1933-37),
IV, 105.
19. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918
(4 vols; London:
Odhams Press Limited, 1932), I, 265.
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The main German air threat to England came from the
fleet of Zeppelins which had been developed before the war.
Churchill was certain the Germans would attempt to operate
these airships from bases near the Belgian coast and,
there, would attack England.

from

The best defense against these

attacks, he believed, was to deny the Belgian bases to Ger
m a n y and,

this failing,

to be prepared to attack the airships

on the ground in Belgium.

He ordered Royal Naval Air Ser

vice aircraft to operate from Dunkirk and Calais to carry
out this mission.

To protect the Dunkirk air squadrons and

any forward air fields which might be established,

Churchill

ordered the formation of patrols of armored motor cars.
These were to operate within 100 miles of Dunkirk.

Since

the motor car patrols were formed to protect the air squad
rons,

Captain Murray Sueter,

placed in command.

the veteran Naval airman, w a s .

Soon the Royal Naval Air Service was oper

ating eight squadrons of armored Rolls Royce automobiles
across the French and Belgian countryside,

fighting probably

the last engagements of movement in a war which was quickly
becoming stagnated in the trenches.

By the end of October,

the trenches of both armies extended to the sea.
cars could not maneuver in the battlefield,

The armored

and the

30

immediate mission of the R. N. A. S. Armored Car Squadrons
, 20

came to an end.

The research and experiments which had characterized
the activities of the R. N. A. S. before the war continued
after hostilities b e g a n .

In 1914,

a torpedo-carrying sea

plane was demonstrated for Churchill,

and in 1915 three tor

pedoes were fired from airplanes against enemy ships in the
Dardanelles and three hits were scored*

21

But full develop

ment and procurement of this weapon was blocked by the Sea
Lords until much later in the war.

22

In 1915, with the fall of the Asquith Ministry,
Churchill left the Admiralty.
Department,

The development of the Air

under Captain Sueter, had been accomplished

20.
I b i d ., I, 267-73.
The armored car battles of the
R. N. A. S. squadrons are certainly one of the most fascin
ating episodes of the entire war.
More fascinating still
is the development from the armored cars of one of the major
new weapons of the war, the tank.
The early research on
this vehicle was a direct result of the experience of the
armored car crews in finding that they could be halted when
the German cavalry dug trenches across the roads.
Churchill
determined that if they could not go around the enemy
defenses, they must be able to go over them.
Development of
the tank was the result.
He says, on p. 271, "The air was the
first cause that took us to Dunkirk.
The armoured car was the
child of the air; and the Tank its grandchild."
21.
Murray F. Sueter, Airmen or Noahs:
Fair Play for
Our Airmen (London, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1928), p. 56.
22.
Ibid.
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largely with C h u r c h i l l 1s blessing and through his encourage
ment.

His methods were unorthodox,

Arthur Balfour succeeded Churchill,
the organization of the air service,

but successful.

When

he immediately changed
replacing the various

functions of supply and operations under the corresponding
departments of the Admiralty.

23

Design and procurement -of

aircraft was split among the several departments and placed
under the supervision of men who had little or no knowledge
of aircraft or flight.

24

As a result, many important

developments in air warfare were delayed.
the air-launched torpedo,

the aircraft carrier,

sance, wireless communications,
Handley Page bomber.

These included

and the construction of the

25

In the new atmosphere at the Admiralty,
defense effort gradually withered away.
never favored Churchill's air-mindedness.
entire air effort as
of naval warfare."

reconnais

the naval air

The Sea Lords had
They saw the

"unrelated to the classic traditions

26

23.
Regulations for the reorganization of the Royal
Naval Air Service were approved by the Board of the Admiralty
in July, 1915.
They stated in part:
"The Royal Naval Air
Service is to be regarded in all respects as an integral part
of the Royal Navy, and in future the various air stations
will be under the general orders of the Commander-in-chief or
Senior Naval Officers in whose district they are situated."
Cited in Raleigh and Jones, I, 485.
24.
I b i d ., II, 353-54.
25.
Sueter, pp. 228-30.
26.
Boyle, p. 122.
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As the war continued,

the most significant early p r o 

gram of the R. N. A, S.--a plan -to bomb Germany--was
thwarted wheh the R. F. C.,

facing chronic shortages of

equipment and battered by the Fokker scourge, was unable to
m e e t its minimum commitment of squadrons for the battle of
the Somme.

Trenchard,

in desperation,

requested and received

eighty of the Naval Service's Sopwith aircraft.

This was the

force which had been built for the raids against Germany.
The R. N. A. S.'s ambitious plans had to be cancelled.
for the Royal Flying Corps,

But,

the Naval Wing's policy of encour-

aging private aircraft manufacturers had saved the day.
Despite its timeliness,

27

this temporary diversion of

Naval aircraft to the use of the Royal Flying Corps was not
the ultimate answer to the supply problems which continued to
plague Trenchard.
part,

These shortages were rooted,

at least in

in the continuing competition between the War Office

a n d the Admiralty for all available resources.

Henderson and

Brancker at the War Office were finding it more and more
difficult to keep the Royal Aircraft Factory supplied with
essential raw materials for aircraft production.

The two

services were competing also for aircraft engines which were

27.

Raleigh and Jones,

II,

452.
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available in the early stages of the war only from France.
There was no pooling of technical developments,
or experiments.

Lloyd George,

inventions,

in his post-war memoirs,

charged that "the net result • . . was overlapping,
ciency,

and a seriously swelling casualty list."
In an attempt to remedy the situation,

in early 1916,

ineffi-

28

the Government,

created the Joint War Air Committee under the

chairmanship of Lord Derby and with members from the War
Office and the Admiralty.

This organization was given the

task of coordinating questions of design and supply for both
air services and, by doing so, to draw the two closer toge
ther.

However,

ity and,

the Committee was given no executive author

after a few months of ineffective wrangling,

disbanded.

In resigning,

was

Lord Derby said that the amalgama

tion of the two services was the only ultimate solution to
the problem.

However,

he added,

the creation of a single air

service was probably too difficult a measure to attempt during
the w a r .29

Public criticism of the administration of the air
services continued.

28.
29.

The Bailhache Committee began hearings

Lloyd George, IV, 106.
Raleigh and Jones, VI, 4.
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in May.

30

After taking evidence for several weeks,

the group

issued a report in August which cleared the air leaders of
any dereliction,
supply system*

but was extremely critical of the military
The Board's report said:

We see no reason against having one Equipment Department
charged with the equipment of both the Army and Navy
flying services.
There would no doubt be inter-service
jealousy to contend with, but that should not be allowed
to stop a much-needed r e f o r m . ^
There were other critical reports.
writing in a periodical,

Lord Montagu,

attacked the Royal Aircraft Factory,

saying its output had been

"negligible," and charging that it

had a "discouraging influence on the development of aircraft.',32
He continued his criticism, claiming in a speech that the time
had arrived when the air service should be capable of inde
pendent action and that the two air services should be placed
under one united control as "an Imperial Air Service".
Lord Milner,

33

soon to become a member of the War Cabi

net, confined his criticism to his notebooks, where he wrote
that "the chief difficulty seems to be that there is no
34
unified direction or well thought-out air p o l i c y . "

30. The Times (London), May 11, 1916, p. 5.
31. Cited in Boyle, p. 194.
32. Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, "Aviation Present and
F u t u r e , " Edinburgh R eview, CCXXIV, No. 475 (July 1916), 144.
33. The Times (London), May 10, 1916, p. 5.
34. John Evelyn Wrench, Alfred Lord Milner, 18541925 (London:
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958), p. 308.

On May 11, Lord Derby's Joint War Air Committee was
succeeded b y ‘the first Air Board with Lord Curzon as its
president.

This body was given somewhat broader powers to

coordinate the production and supply efforts of the two air
services, but still had no executive authority.

The Board

was directed to arrange for the free exchange of technical
information and to eliminate competition between the two
departments.

However,

all disputes which arose between the

Admiralty and the War Office had to be referred to the War
Com m i tt e e .^
In July,

the Somme offensive began,

and Trenchard

increased his pleas for equipment to carry on the air battle
in France.

In August, with the-Air Board making every

effort to fill Trenchard's requests,

Curzon discovered that

the Admiralty planned to spend three million pounds sterling
on an independent program of air expansion.

His bitter p r o 

tests to Balfour brought only the rejoinder that the
Admiralty had no intention of surrendering its planning
authority to the Air Board.

36

As a result of this incident,

the Air Board issued

a report criticizing the Admiralty and condemning its lack

35.
36.

"Fifty Years of Military Aviation," pp. 4-5.
Boyle, p. 193.

of cooperation.

The report,

dated October 23, 1916,

said

in part:
No expansion of ths work of the Air Board, no complete
fulfillment of the charge with which it was entrusted,
and no adequate provision for the urgent necessities of
the future, are . . . possible, so long as the Admiralty
adopts its present attitude towards the Air Board, and
so long as the administration of the branch of the. air
service which is in the hands of the Admiralty is con
ducted on the present lines.
Publication of this report led to the exchange of a
series of acrimonious letters between Curzon and Balfour.
Finally,

the War Committee, meeting on November 27 and 28,

agreed to make major changes in the powers of the Air Board.
These were in the draft stage when the Asquith Government
fell, but they received formal approval by the new ministers
of the Lloyd George coalition on December 22,

1916.

The

changes provided that the Ministry of Munitions should be
responsible for design and supply of aircraft,

and that the

Air Board should allocate all available material resources
between the Admiralty and the War Office.

Along with the

broadened authority, the Air Board got a new leader when Lord
Cowdray succeeded Curzon as president.
and Secretaries Act,

37.
Lloyd George,

IV,

The New Ministries

1916, which brought the second Air

"First Report of the Air B o ard," as cited in
108.

37

Board into being,

provided that:

"For the purpose of this

Act the President of the Air Board shall be deemed to be a
Minister appointed under this Act,

and the Air Board a Minis-

38
try established under this Act #"

The first faltering step

toward the creation of a new air service had been taken.

38.
Cited in "Fifty Years of Military Aviation,"
p. 5. See also Hilary St. George Saunders, Per Ardua (London:
Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 218-19.

CHAPTER III

AI R RAIDS AND REPERCUSSIONS

On January 7, 1915, Admiral von Pohl,
German Naval Staff,

Chief of the

sent a memorandum to the Kaiser urging

t h a t ■G e r m a n y 's fleet of airships be used to attack and bomb
England.

London/

he maintained,

was a defended area with

large military establishments.

Air raids on the city would

be permissible under the Geneva Convention and would be
militarily sound.

Of course,

he said,

the German airship

commanders would make every effort to avoid historical
buildings or private property.
posal for two days,

After considering the p r o 

the Kaiser approved the bombing of

England, but specified that the attacks be confined to m u n i 
tions factories,
lishments.

arsenals,

London,

shipyards,

and military estab

he decreed, was not to be bombed. ■*"

On January 19, a pair of German Zeppelins crossed
high over the east coast of England and dropped the first
"

'

1

■■

11
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1.
of Winged Mars
1947), p. 354.

"

'

1

..... .

■

1

'

1—

■

■

1 '■

!*

■

-1 ' ■

John R* Cuneo, The Air Weapon, 1914-16, Vol.
(Harrisburg:
Military Service Publishing Co.,
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bombs on Yarmouth and King's Lynn,
spared for long.

Norfolk.

London was not

On May 31, a German airship,

time with William II's reluctant approval,

armed this

passed over the

British capital at a great height and dropped its load of
bombs on the northeast sector of the city.

2

In this way began one of the most controversial
aspects of the war in the air.

For over a year,

the giant

Zeppelins crossed over the English countryside with virtual
immunity,

riding well above t h e 'feeble efforts of the oppos

ing British fighters to reach them.

Actual military damage

caused by the airships was negligible,
aroused.

but the people were

The raids brought constantly increasing pressure

on the government and on the military services.
As we have seen,

immediately after the war began,

Churchill accepted responsibility for the air defense of
the island kingdom as part of the mission of the Royal Naval
Air Service.

His unorthodox,

but direct, method of attack

ing this problem was to seek out the German airships on the

2.
Kenneth Poolman, Zeppelins Against London (New
York:
The John Day Co., 1961), pp. 35-36.
This was the
LZ38, commanded by Hauptman Linnarz.
The Times for June 1,
1915, p. 8, noted only that a German airship had been "near"
London and that a large number of fires had been set, and
then printed the text of a government statement prohibiting
any publication of news of the raid.
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ground in Belgium and to attempt to destroy them there-.

r>

This tactic met with some early successes, but it made no
provision for attacking the high-flying airships which did
find their way over England.
The Zeppelins,

The problem was simple enough.

awkward and hard to handle on the ground, when

airborne operated at altitudes which the fighters could not.
reach.

Coupied with this deficiency in aircraft performance

was a serious shortage of anti-aircraft artillery pieces and
a shortage of the large search lights essential to spot the
raiders during a night; a t t a c k , j t

made little difference

which service had the responsibility for air defense of the
home island.
able,

Until suitable equipment could be made avail

little could be done.
From the first,

the immunity with which the giant

airships traversed England's skies brought harsh criticism
of the Royal Flying Corps.
ume,

Lord Kitchener,

to head it off.

As the criticism mounted in vol

the Secretary of State for War, moved

He directed the R. F . C. to work out a

method of attacking the German airships despite General

3.
Lord H a nkey, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918
(2 vols; London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961),
I, 239.
4 - I b i d ., I, 240.
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Henderson's protests that air defense was the Navy's respon
sibility. ^
With the heavy demands of the Expeditionary Force and
the needs of the training school already taking every avail
able m a c h i n e , Colonei Sefton Brancker now had to locate air
craft for the defense mission.
from other tasks,

By diverting men and machines

an initial token effort was established

with aircraft at Joyce Green and Brooklands.

Later,

a

reserve squadron was established at South Farnborough.^
In mid 1915, when Balfour succeeded Churchill at the
Admiralty,

one of his first acts was to request that the War

Office assume responsibility for air defense of the home
island.

The War Office,

carry out this mission,

no better equipped than the Navy to
agreed to Balfour's proposal,

actual transfer was not concluded until early 1916.

but the

7

The military value of these first Zeppelin raids was
questionable.

However,

the effect on the morale of the

5.
In a description of one of the earliest raids,
General Headquarters, Home Forces, lists, under the title
"Action of A i r p l a n e s , " six sorties flown by R. N. A. S. air
craft f and adds significantly:
"Royal Flying Corps.
No
action."
Cited in Poolman, p. 65.
6.
I b i d ., pp. 73-75.
7.
Boyle, Trenchard's biographer, blames the delay
for the transfer of responsibility on "the prevailing spirit
of indecisiveness in W h i t e h a l l . " See Andrew Boyle, Trenchard
(London:
Collins, 1962), p. 159.
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British people ahd,

through them,

ment, was significant,

the effect on the Govern

Londoners,

particularly, were hard

hit by the savage shock of the bombings.

As the raids

increased in tempo in the fall of 1915,

the intensity of

public feeling grew.

the first man to

Sir John Slessor,

attack a Zeppelin in the air,

and later a Marshal of the

Royal Air Force, wrote that following a raid on October 13,
1915,

conditions in Bast London were

panic".

8

"not far removed from

The Times noted in an editorial,

"to create panic

has always been one of the chief objects of these /air/
invasions.

They have now caused almost 700 casualties,

chiefly amongst civilians,
The Government took defensive measures.

Lighting

restrictions were extended from London over all the eastern,
central and northwestern areas of England.

"Experience

gained from the Zeppelin raid of January 31, / I 916/ shows
that this extension
reported.But
of the people.
-

'"I

—

l. |

—

...

is necessary," The Times

as the lights went down,

so did the spirits

The nuisance value of the Zeppelin could not
I -

.
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8.
The statement is on p. x of the Foreword which
Slessor wrote for P o o l m a n 1s book.
9.
The Times (London).,, February 2, 1916, p. 9.
The
casualty figure was high.
I b i d . February 9, 1916, p. 8.
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be ignored.

Even an isolated raid over the midlands alarmed

the public seriously.
However#
skies,

11

despite its psychological value in England's

the Zeppelin was a poor military weapon.

extremely subject to the whims of the weather,
aged in turbulence#
conditions.

It was
easily dam

and was at the mercy of adverse wind

By the fall of 1916#

the pilots of the R. F. C.,

with improved equipment and new tactics, brought the huge
airships within range of their guns.
Lieutenant W. Leefe Robinson,

On September 23,

flying a B. E. 2C of one of

the newly-formed Home Defense Squadrons,

attacked the Schutte-

Lanz S. L. 11 in a daring night battle and brought it down
in flames near Cuffley.
Victoria Cross.

For his feat, he was awarded the

12

Other victories by the R. F. C. followed,

and these,

coupled with numerous accidental losses by the Germans,
in late 1916,
German airmen,

to a decline in the Zeppelin raids.
however# were not finished.

were replaced by the Gotha,

led,

The

The Zeppelins

a twin-engine bombing airplane

11.
Boyle, p. 160.
12.
"Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962,"
a Chronology published by the Air Ministry (London:
1962),
P- 5,

-
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superior to anything the allies had*
began pight and,

later,

The Gothas immediately

daylight attacks on London.

The raids by the Gothas, just as the airship raids,
had little direct military value.

However,

the effect of

flights of enemy bombers appearing over London in mid-day,

-

wending their way across the city and bombing indiscrimi
nately as they went, brought the British people to the brink
of panic.

The value of the raids in slowing production of

munitions--the vital element in the war of the trenches—
while incalculable, was undoubtedly very significant.
On June 13,

1917,

a flight of twenty-one Gothas

attacked England in a daring daylight raid.

Fourteen of

the bombers made their way to London where they dropped 118
high-explosive bombs,
station.

one directly on the Liverpool Street

Nearly 150 people were killed and 350 injured.

Ninety British fighters rose to attack the bomber formation,,,
but not a single Gotha was brought down.

13

This raid seriously aroused the people, but when the
Gothas struck again on July 7, public opinion boiled over
in threats against the Government and its leaders.

The most

popular British newspaper declared:
"■■T " w

...........

—

13.

....... i"T

Raleigh and Jones,

i
,
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V, 26-28.
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Since the Dutch burned Chatham 250 years; ago «, . .
there has not been a more discreditable event in our
military history, . . » There is not a single redeem
ing fact.
The story is altogether humiliating,^^
Another journal complained that defense squadrons had been
withdrawn from London to put on an exhibition for the King
in France,

and that still other aircraft had been taken from

their defense duties to escort Princess Mary when she went
to visit Southend,^5
Members of the Air Board watched the attack from the
balconies of the Hotel Cecil where their offices were
located.
the press#

To them and to the other members of the Government#
and the public,

the weakness of the nation's air

defenses was only too apparent.
few hours after the raid,

When the War Cabinet met a

it was in an atmosphere of glum

recrimination.
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
Robertson, wrote to General Douglas Haig,
forces in France,

Sir William

commanding the

that the Cabinet meeting was unbelievable.

"One would have thought that the world was coming to an end, "
said the Field Marshal.

"I could not get in a word edgeways."I?

14.
Daily M a i l , July 9, 1917, as cited in J. M.
Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3d ed. rev.y London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), p. 7.
15.
The S t a r , July 23, 1917, as cited in Spaight, p. 8.
16.
Boyle, pp. 223-24.
17.
Sir William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen,
1914-1918 (2 vols? New Yorks
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926),
XI, 17.
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T^e Prime Minister,
of the raid,

recalling his feelings on the day

said?

There was no way of preventing these enemy planes from
coming over.
The most effective measure . . . was to
furnish a powerful air fleet for home defence . . . and
to carry out reprisal raids on enemy cities on a scale
which would convince them that this form of warfare was
a bad business.
For both of these purposes, large numbers of planes were needed. °
During the course of the war,

the German raiders

attacked England on 103 separate missions and dropped 8,579
bombs weighing over 270 tons.

The attacks resulted in the

deaths qf 1,4Q4 persons and injuries to 3,416 others.

Mone-

tary damage reached almost three million pounds sterling.

1Q
J

Twenty-five oi these raids were directed against the London
metropolitan area,
1,960 injuries-

and these resulted in 67 0 deaths and

Over two-thirds of the monetary damage was

done in the London area.

20

Assessment of the actual value of the raids has
ranged from that of Kapitanleutnant H. Hollender,
airship commander,

a German

who claimed that 500,000 men and enormous

18.
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
George (6 vols.? Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1933-37),
IV, 115.
19. With neat British precision, the official h i stor
ian has worked this out to 0.56 casualties per bomb dropped,
and a monetary damage of 345 pounds sterling per bomb
dropped.
The figures are in Raleigh and Jones, Appendices,
p. 164.
20.
Ibid.
i

" i - i i
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numbers of guns and aircraft were kept immobilized,

21

to

those of the patriotic writers who maintained that the raids
actually strengthened British morale.
fell somewhere between.

Certainly the truth

The raids caused a serious drop in

production of war materials/
London, but,

22

not only in the vicinity of

according to the official historian,

the midlands end in the north."

23

"also in

Sykes thought that the

psychological effect was far greater than the actual casual
ties but that any air raid warning caused a "serious diminu
tion of output" of war materials-

This extended, he said,

beyond the locality raided and lasted well after the raid
had ended,

24

Field Marshal Robertson noted the tendency

for London residents of the East End to panic during the
raids and the scurrying search for refuge which,

in late

21.
The German Air Force in the Great W a r , comp.
George Paul Neumann (London:
Hopper and Stoughton, Ltd.,
n . d . ), p. 123.
22.
Cuneo, p. 361, says:
"It is loosely stated in
many sources that the raids actually raised the British
morale.
This is sheer nonse n s e . " However, the young Sholto
Douglas, recuperating at home after an aircraft accident in
France, recalled that, "although the people at home were
disturbed over the casualties, and rightly horrified that
the Germans should have Staged these raids, I did not find
that the home front was in any way shaken."
Sholto Douglas,
Years of Combat (Londop:
Collins, 1963), p. 211.
23.
Raleigh and Jones, III, 245-47.
24.
Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles (London:
George G- Farrap & Company, Ltd., 1942), p. 222.
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19X7,

found as msny

300,000 people sleeping in the tubes

even when there were no alarms.
ing the raids in late 1917,

At Woolwich arsenal,

follow

output of .303 cartridges dropped

to nineteen per cent of normal.

25

The overall effect on

British munitions production was placed as high as a onesixth reductipn.

Equally important,

aircraft which were

needed in France were retained at

home

to

On some ogcasfons,

even

ordered to return

squadrons were

from France for home defense.
Sir George Cave,

counter the attacks.

27

the Home Secretary,

probably best

described the value of the raids when he said on June 14,
1917,

that ", . * it would be worth the enemy's while to

have these raids every day.
all munition factories,
munitions-"

And this,

.. . . If you

you put a
he said,

stop

give warning to
to

the manufacture of

"will have its effect on the

fighting forces and the lives of our soldiers and sailors."28
The pressure on the Government was becoming intense
even before the daylight raid of July 7, 1917.

On June 17,

25.
Robertson, II, 16.
See also Cuneo, p. 361, and
Cyril Falls, The First World War (London:
Longmans Green
and Co., Ltd., I960), pp. 347-48.
26.
Brigadier General Percy R. C. Groves, Behind the
Smoke Screen (London:
Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1934), pp.
117-18.
27.
Robertson, II, 16.
28.
Cited in The Aeroplane, January 2, 1918, p. 21.
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a mass meeting

was held at the London Opera House under

the

sponsorship of

The Daily E x p r e s s .The Lord

as

Mayor acted

the chairman/ and two members of Parliament who had consis
tently attached the Government's air policies,

Noel

Pemberton-Dilling and Basil Peto, were among the speakers.
The Aeroplane noted that

'’the meeting unanimously and emphat

29
ically demanded a policy of reprisals against G e r m a n y . "
On July 9, a secret session of the House of Commons was
held to discuss the air raids,

and on July 13, all the

London M. P.s went as a deputation to Lloyd George to demand
that something
The two

be done to protect the city.

30

favorite themes of the public protests were

demands for huge air fleets to protect the home island
and equally vociferous demands for fleets of British bombers
to attack Germany.

With the Royal Flying Corps's major

forces committed to the trench-bound battle in France,
and with the continued inadequate exploitation of the air
weapon by the Admiralty,
obviously impossible.

to follow both these courses was

To follow either of them adequately

appealed to be very nearly impossible.

29.
30.

Ibid,
I b i d ., January 9, 1918, p. 143.
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Many Englishmen believed a single air service was
an essential first St©P to find a way out of the dilemma.
Those who had long fought for such a goal suddenly found
their cause gaining many new advocates,

CHAPTER XV

ONE ELEMENT— ONE SERVICE

The Roy^l Flying Corps was created in 1912 as a
separate and unified force.

However, by 1914,

the intran

sigence pf the Admiralty split the new force in two,

and

Britain entered the war with a weah and ill-equipped ser
vice.

Now,

warfare,

after three years of bloody,

land-locked

thoughtful men were demanding that the nation's

air weapon again be welded into one.
Lord Haldane's sub-committee of the Committee of
imperial .Defence recommended in 1911 that,

"The British

Aeronautical Service should be regarded as one,
b e designated

'The Flying Corps'."1

and should ,

This recommendation,

approved by the Asquith Cabinet, was the basis of the Royal
Warrant which created the Royal Flying Corps.
was,

The R. F. C.

according to the Committee of Imperial Defence,

include a Military Wing,

a Naval Wing,

to

a Central Flying

1.
Walter Raleigh and H- A. Jones, War in the Air
(6 vols. and appendices; Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 19221937), I, 206.
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School,

a Reserve,

and the Royal Aircraft Factory.

While

the young airmen accepted and hailed this decision as the
beginning of a new service,

the older military leaders,

notably those at the Admiralty, were determined that it
should not be.

2

The main difficulty for the airmen lay in the basic
organization of the R. F. C.

The original Joint Air Com

mittee was formed to coordinate the air policies of the
Admiralty and the War Department.

But it had no decision

making authority and had ceased to function long before the
war.

Under these conditions/

it was not difficult for the

Admiralty to turn the Naval Wing into the Royal Naval Air
Service and make it independent of the rest of the Royal
Flying Corps.
Despite the Admiralty's coup,

the question of an

independent air service was constantly debated from 1911
until the Royal Air Force was finally formed in 1918.

Major

2.
F. M. Sykes, the first Commander of the Military
Wing, writing of the earliest days of the R. F. C. in 1912,says:
"1 was convinced that the correct policy . . . was
to regard the Air Service as a separate arm, distinct from
the other two services, and that it would become of equal
status with them.
This idea was violently opposed by
senior naval and military officers." Frederick Sykes, From
Many Angles (London:
George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1942),
p. 98.
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Frederick Sykes,

first Commander of the Military Wing of the

R. F. C., was questioned on the subject when he presented a
paper on military aviation to the Aeronautical Society on
February 4, 1914,

A member of the House of Commons asked

Sykes if the flying corps was to remain part of the Army and
Navy or to become a separate service.
General David Henderson,

Neither Sykes nor

who was also present,

provided an

answer for the M. P., but the question indicated the level
of continuing interest in the problem.

3

More serious agitation for a single air service began
in 1915, when the crushing advent in France of the Fokker
era and the Zeppelin raids on London combined to shatter
public confidence in the G o v e r n m e n t 1s air policies.
casualty lists from France grew longer,

As the

the nation's leaders

sought reasons for the apparent inferiority of the R. F. C.
They found them in the inherent weaknesses in the administra
tion of the air services and in the constant competition for
material and manpower between the Admiralty and the War
O f f i c e .4

3.
The Aer o p l a ne, February 12, 1914, p. 164.
4.
John R. Cuneo, The Air Weapons, 1914-16, Vol.
of Winged Mars (Harrisburg:
Military Service Publishing
Co., 1947), p. 285.
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On July 20,

1915, William Joynson-Hicks,

the same m e m 

ber of Commons who had que-stioned Sykes in February,

1914,

rose in, the House to suggest the appointment of "some man
of imagination and power" to advise the Government on creating an efficient air service.

5

He was followed in the

debate by other members who urged a "separate department for
0

aeroplanes and particularly a Ministry of A e r o planes."
The Globe newspaper began an editorial campaign urging
a separate service.
October 13,

Charles Palmer,

the editor, wrote on

1915:

We kept our land inviolate so long as the sea was the
method of approach to our shores.
The menace now is
from the air.
It is a menace that grows more actual
every day. . . . Those who know and understand the
danger will be supported in the demand for a Royal Air
Service as a separate fighting force, with all that
makes such a force complete and efficient. . . .
If
the Government will not move . . . the nation must make
7
them m o v e .
The Times joined in to note editorially that

"the

presence of a squadron of enemy aircraft over English soil
emphasizes the advent of a new element in warfare.

. . .

5.
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
LXXIII (1915), 1357,
6.
Ibid., 1377.
7.
Cited in Murray
Sue ter, Airmen or Noahs t Fair
Play for Our Airmen (London:
Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd.,
1928), p. 225.
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The mastery of the air may at no distant time be not less
vital

g
. . . than the mastery of the s e a . "
In the House of Lords,

Montagu who,

late in the fall of 1915 during a debate on

the air service,
vice."

the fight was led by Lord

coined the phrase,

"one element,

one ser

This slogan became a rallying cry for the supporters

of a single air service in the press and in Parliament.
Lord Montagu told a meeting on May 10,

1916,

g

that the time

had arrived when the air service should act independently.
He urged combining the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal
Flying Corps into one fighting force called the
Air Service.

"Imperial

The Times forecast editorially that "a

rearrangement of the Air Service on a considerable scale is
in prospect-

- - -

Neither House is satisfied with the Air

record of the Governmentthe attack on Ma y 23,

11

Lord Montagu,

returning to

launched a lengthy debate in the House

of Lords when he urged the members to declare:
That this House considers that the development of avia
tion for purposes of war can no longer be efficiently
carried on under the present system of the divided con
trol and responsibility of two separate Departments;

8.
9.
10.
11-

The Times
Sueter, p.
The Times
I b i d ., May

(London), February 3, 1916, p, 9.
228.
(London), May 10, 1916, p. 5.
13, 1916, p. 7.
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and that the time has now arrived when the supply of
men and materials should be concentrated under single
c o n t r o l .^
The most flamboyant and colorful politician leading the
fight for revision of the Government's air policies was Noel
Pemberton-Billing.

He was one of the earliest British air

pioneers.

he organized the Supermarine Aviation

Works,

In 1911,

and when the war began, he was commissioned in the

Royal Naval Air Service.

He organized and planned the air

raid by R. N. A. S. forces on the Zeppelin plant at Friedrichshafen November 21,
ceived and executed,

1914.

This raid,

brilliantly con

gave Pemberton-Billing a considerable

reputation as an air authority.

However,

he rapidly became

disillusioned with the manner in which the air weapon was
being used.
1916,

and,

March,

He resigned from the R. N. A. S. in January,
returning home, was elected to Parliament in

1916.

13

No sooner had Pemberton-Billing assumed his seat in
the House of Commons than he launched a virulent attack on
the R. F. C.

He charged that the air leaders were guilty of

criminal negligence and that the aircraft procured by the

XXII

12.
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates
(1916), 101.
13.
Cuneo, pp. 443-44n.

(Lords),
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R. F. C. were

"Fokker fodder".

He said that "quite a num

ber of our gallant officers in the Royal Flying Corps have
been rather murdered than k i l l e d " . ^

His attack caused a

considerable stir and forced the Government to promise an
independent investigation into the administration and command
of the Royal Flying Corps.

The result was the Bailhache

inquiry.
The Bailhache Committee began taking testimony in
May.

15

_

.

By August 3, the Committee issued an interim

report vindicating the leaders of the Royal Flying Corps and
the Royal Aircraft Factory,

and even expressing admiration

for the effort made under the stress of w a r . ^
report,

issued in December,

The final

recommended the creation of an

Air Board to supervise the design and construction of aircraft for both services.

i 7

14.
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
LXXXI (1916), 246.
15.
Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London:
Collins, 1962),
p. 175.
According to Boyle, T r e n c h a r d 's biographer, Trenchard
was greatly concerned about the effects of the Bailhache
hearings on the morale of his pilots and blamed Henderson
for urging the Government to conduct them.
16.
The report was called a white wash.
See C. G.
Grey, A History of the Air Ministry (London:
George Allen
and Unwin, 1940), pp. 54-60.
17.
Raleigh and Jones, I, 162.
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Appointment of the Bailhache Committee did not stem
the criticism.

Lord Montagu,

in an article published after

the appointment of the Bailhache group,
ance of the interim report in August,

but before the issu

wrote:

The criticisms of the flying services . . . which began
in 1914 and were at their height in the spring of this
year / T 9 1 6 h a v e . . . on the whole produced good
results.
But . . . questions of greater importance
have been left out of sight.
The main question is
whether our present programme of military aviation is
adequate. . . . Till recently the programme was dis-.
tinctly inadequate.
We have not enough airplanes at
the front today to do the w o r k .
In addition to launching the Bailhache inquiry,

the

Government responded to the increasing criticism by appoint
ing a new Joint War Air Committee with Lord Derby as p resi
dent.

This group was charged with coordinating the problems

of supply and design of aircraft for both the R. F. C. and
the R. N. A. S., but it had no executive authority.
the defunct Joint Air Committee,

Like

the new body could only

make recommendations to the Admiralty and the War Office.
After only eight meetings,

both Derby and Lord Montagu,

the

two independent members who did not belong to either of the
contending agencies,

resigned.

It was apparent that volun-

tary agreements could not be reached.

19

The first wartime

18.
Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, "Aviation Present and
Future, " Edinburgh Re v i ew, CCXXIV, No. 457 (July, 1916), 142.
19.
Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (2
v o l s . ; London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), II, 549.
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attempt at joint air coordination had come forth stillborn,
strangled by i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l wrangling over parochial
views.
To fill this void,
Maurice Hanfcey,

Lord Curzon,

a Cabinet member,

the Secretary of the War Committee,

and

drew up

a plan for an Air Board to be headed by a Cabinet Minister
and with greater authority than the Joint War Air Committee.
The president was authorized to refer disputes between the
Admiralty and the Wa r Office to the War Committee for deci
sion-

The Board was given the broadest possible charter to

discuss all policy matters related to the air war and parti
cularly to matters of combined operations of the Naval and
Military services-

It was also to mahe recommendations on

air equipment for both services and to coordinate the free
and complete interchange of research and inventions.
was chosen as the Board's president-

20

Curzon

In revealing the plan

for the Air Board, both Curzon and Bonar Law indicated it was
the first step toward an Air M i n i s t r y -

21

2-0*
I b i d - Trenchard, when he heard of the plan for
the Air Board, thought its powers pretentious and its author
ity vague.
He wrote to Henderson that "I suppose that m oun
tain of conceit G. N. C. /Curzon/" will be put in as head of
it. 11 Cited in Boyle, p- 176.
21.
Hankey, II, 549.
See also Great Britain, 5
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), LXXXII (1916), 1599-1618.
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The new Board,

spurred on by Curzon,

was extremely

active and held several meetings each week.

However,

this

n e w drive soon foundered on the same shoal which had sunk
its two predecessors-^Admiralty opposition•
twenty-five meetings,

After some

Curzon wrote the report to the War

Committee in which he attacked Balfour's obstructionist attitude*

22

The report resulted in a lengthy exchange of sharp

a n d bitter memoranda between the two men*

The War Committee

was in the midst of this battle and was considering a scheme
to expand the powers of the Air Board when the Asquith
Government fell*

23

One of the first decisions of Lloyd George's new War
Cabinet in December,

19X7, was to clarify and broaden the

powers of the Air Board*

Curzon,

appointed to the War C abi

net, was succeeded at the Air Board by Lord Cowdray,
paper publisher*

The Board became a Ministry and the presi-

dent a Minister of the Government*
later,

a news

on February 2, 1917,

24

A month and a half

the War Cabinet further stream

lined the process of aircraft procurement*

The Air Board

was made responsible for experimental work,

approval of

22*
See above, Chapter IX*
23*
Hankey, II, 550-51*
24*
"Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962,"
a Chronology published b y the Air Ministry (London:
1962),
p* 5*
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aircraft design,
ordered,

and for the number of each model to be

and the appropriate allocation between the R. F. C.

and the R , N„ A. S.

At the same time,

the Ministry of Muni

tions was given full responsibility for production,
tion,

and delivery of aircraft.

conflict,

inspec

After years of confusion and

the first positive action had been taken to solve

the problems of aircraft supply.
However, by July,

25

continuing Parliamentary and press

attacks on the Government's air policies touched a sensitive
nerve within the Lloyd George Cabinet.

As protests over the

daylight bombing raids on London approached a crescendo,

the

War Cabinet responded on July 11 by naming a special
committee to consider both the problem of air defense and
the broader and more significant problem of air organization
in general.

The select committee was to be headed by the

Prime Minister himself,

so important was the problem.

To

25.
C. G. Grey, the vitriolic editor of The Aeroplane
challenges the otherwise generally undisputed fact of in
creased production under the joint direction of the second
Air Board and the Ministry of Munitions.
He says that in
the Air Board's offices at the Hotel Cecil each bedroom was
occupied by a bureaucrat concerned only with getting his own
requisitions filled.
The result, claims Grey, was utter
confusion.
So great did the confusion become that the Hotel
Cecil came to be called Bolo House after a German spy, Bolo
Pasha, "because everybody there was either actively interfer
ing with the progress of the War, or was doing nothing to
help its progress."
Grey, p. 65.
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serve with him,

and to actually conduct the investigation,

Lloyd George selected the South African leader,
General Jan, Christian Smuts.

Lieutenant

Smuts was told to examine all
<r\

/"

aspects of the use of the air weapon.
charge.

From his investigation,

It was a fateful

eventually,

came the Royal

Air F o r c e .

26.
George (6 vols.;
IV, 118.

David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
BQSton:
Little Brown and Company, 1933-37),

CHAPTER V

SMUTS:

RIGHT MAN,

RIGHT TIME

Jan Christian Smuts held a unique position in the
British Government.

He fought the English in the Boer War,

but in 1916 defended the British Empire,

directing the cam

paign against Letto w - V orbeck's forces in German East Africa.
In 1917,

as the South African Minister of Defense,

he came

to London to attend a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet.
Lloyd George immediately recognized S m u t s 's outstand
ing abilities and prevailed upon him to remain in London as
a member of the War Cabinet.'*"

Smuts 1s decision not to seek

election to Parliament to "legalize" his appointment kept
him free from the entanglements of internal British
2
politics.

1.
Lloyd George says that this "called forth some
indignant protests from members of my ministry, who were
horrified at the unprecedented step I was t a k i n g . " See
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (6
vols,; Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1933-37), IV, 93.
2. William Keith Hancock, Smuts:
The Sanguine
Years,_ 1870-1919 (Cambridge:
University Press, 1962), p.
436.
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W hen pressure for an investigation of the Government's
air policies reached a peak in July,

1917,

sought a man w ith a "fresh and able mind,
mental prejudices" for the task*
Smuts.

3

Lloyd George
free from depart-

His seeking eye fell on

Free from parochial views and untainted b y political

controversies,

Smuts brought to the task a reputation for

honesty and integrity and a strong desire to see the war won
as quickly as possible.
Smuts well knew the political controversy which had
grown up over the air services during the war and at first
was reluctant to head the investigation.

It was only when

the Prime Minister agreed to assume the political responsi
bility by calling hir^self the chairman of the committee that
Smuts agreed tp undertake the task.

4

The War Cabinet directed Smuts to consult with
resentatives pf the Admiralty,

"rep

the General Staff and Field-

Marshal Commanding-in-Chief Home F o r c e s , " and with "such
other experts as / h e / may desire."
examined:

Two problems were to be

"(1) The defence arrangements for Home Defence

3.
Lloyd George, IV, 118.
4.
Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the Air
(6 volso and appendices; oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1922^37),
VI, 11.
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against air raids," and "(2) The air organization generally
and the direction of aerial operations,"
Smuts, with characteristic drive, began immediate
hearings.

By July 19, he reported to the War Cabinet that

the German air raids had succeeded because England's air
defense was poorly organized,

London,

his report said, was

the nerve center of the Empire and might find itself within
six months on the front"line of battle.
man air threat,

To counter the Ger

drastic measures were required.

These

Included the assignment of all responsibility for air defense
to a single commander,

the reorganization of anti-aircraft

weapons into concentric circles around London,
development of new air tactics,
in formation,^

and the

including fighters operating

The War Cabinet quickly put these recommen

dations into effect.
The second task,
policy,

the overall examination of air

was a m uch larger problem.

Smuts,

after consulting

5,
I b i d ,, Appen dices, 8,
6,
Raleigh and Jones, V, 41-44,
By August 5/ the
London Air Defence Area had been created under the command
of Major General E. B. Ashmore, and three new R. F. C. squad
rons equipped with Camels and Pups had been ifbrffied specifi
cally to operate against the Gothas in the daylight raids.
See "Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962," a Chron
ology published by the Air Ministry (London:
1962), p, 5.
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Lloyd George,

decided three questions must be answered by

the investigation.

These were:

1.
Shall there be instituted a real Air Ministry
responsible for all air organization and operations?
2.
Shall there be constituted a unified Air Ser
vice embracing both the present Royal Naval Air Service
and Royal Flying Corps?
3.
If so, how shall the relations of the new Air
Service to the Navy and Army be determined so that the
functions at present discharged for them by the
R. N. A. S. and R. F. C. respectively shall continue
to be efficiently performed by the new Air Service?^
The hearings which Smuts held revealed the depth and
intensity of the dispute over national air policy.

The

views expressed in secret session covered a wide range.
Some witnesses thought the controversy was unrelated to
the successful completion of a bitter,

land-locked war which

was draining the resources of the combatant nations.

Others

saw a single air service as the only solution to the stale
mate of the trenches.

Among the latter,

Smuts found many

who wanted to plan for a single air service,

but feared

reorganizing during the war would be an impossible task.
Others favored expansion of the powers of the Air Board,

even

to the point of forming a third air service under Air Board

7.

Lloyd George,

IV,

120.
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control.

A few favored the ultimate step of unification of

the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps into
\

one separate force,

the equal of the Army and the Navy.

Smuts initially leaned toward the view that complete
reorganization of the British air service should be delayed
Q

until after the war.
opinipn.
Cowdray,

Two important documents changed this

The first of these was a memorandum from Lord
dated July 28,

of the Air Board,

1917.

In it Cowdray,

the President

set out his ideas on air organization.

He

proposed that the present Air Board be given a "war staff of
recognized experts."

This staff,

Cowdray said,

should plan

for the single service which would be formed when the war
was finished.
he wrote,

However,

"it appears to me beyond q u e s t i o n , "

"that during the war the administration of the

Naval and Military Air Services as they at present exist . .
should not be changed.

Q

More important,

Cowdray's discussion of what he called the
Fleet."

Early in the summer of 1917,

tion of the first Air Board,

however, was
"Surplus Aircraft

following reorganiza

Cowdray and Sir William Weir,

in charge of aircraft procurement for the Ministry of

8.
9.

Hancock, p. 441.
Raleigh and Jones,

VI,

8-9.
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Mlmitions,
craft.

had forecast a big increase in production of air

This increase,

they claimed, would create a surplus

beyond the needs of the Army and the Navy.

Cowdray now p r o 

posed to Smuts that this surplus be used to form a bombing
force controlled by the w a r s t a f f of the Air Board.
s h o u l d , " he said,

"It

"be possible for the Surplus Aircraft Fleet

to be placed directly under the Air Board without any serious
dislocation of existing arrangements."10

Smuts quickly

detected the flaw in C o w d r a y 's somewhat contradictory plan.
Under it, there would be added to the War Office and Admir
alty air policies,

Air Board air policies.

This would be

no solution but an added complication.
The second important document submitted to Smuts was
the memorandum by Lieutenant General David Henderson,

dated

10.
I b i d ., VI, 9.
The figures on the Surplus A i r 
craft Fleet were a projection by Cowdray and by Sir William .
Weir, Controller of Aeronautical Supplies in the Ministry
of Munitions.
Lloyd George indicates in his memoirs that
he accepted the figures and believed that "we should soon
possess an air fleet much in excess of the necessary demands
of the Army and Navy."
See Lloyd George, IV, 117.
C. G.
Grey, writing in The Aeroplane on January 9, 1918, says that
the efforts of Cowdray and Weir to increase aircraft produc
tion got the "R. F. C. in the field . . . thoroughly well
equipped" by the end of 1917.
Boyle maintains that Smuts
was misled by the personnel in the Supplies and Contracts
Branch of the Air Board and that if he had not believed that
the Surplus Aircraft Fleet would eventually be produced, he
would never have signed the Smuts Report.
See Boyle, pp.
23 3, 243.
The projected figures, had they been met, would
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July 19,

1917.

After surveying the entire air problem,

Henderson criticised the way in which authority for air
planning was divided among the various branches of the
Government.

He cited a recently approved increase in the

sisc of the R» F. C, as an e x a m p l e „

For this War Cabinet-

approved action to actually come about, he said,

the Air

Board and the Ministry of Munitions would have to supply
the machines,

the Army Council the personnel,

and the.

Department of Fortifications and Works the additional air
fields.

Should any of these agencies fail,

strength would not be achieved,

the increase in

and this failure would.be

for reasons well outside the authority of the Air B o a r d . ^

have provided for an Air Force of 200 Service Squadrons.
They were not met primarily because of disastrous failures
in engine production.
In January, 1918, there were 400 new
S. E. 5 airplanes in storage because no engines were avail
able for them.
See Raleigh and Jones, VI, all of Chapter II.
Despite this, in discussing the Surplus Aircraft Fleet fig
ures and particularly in weighing Smuts 1s belief in them, it
is necessary to evaluate the actual war-end position of the
Royal Air Force.
In November, 1918, the R. A. F. had. over
22,000 airplanes, and the n a t i o n 's aircraft industry was p r o 
ducing about 110 airplanes each day--aimost twice the entire
force Henderson ha,d been able to muster to cross the channel
in 1915.
See J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3d ed.
r e v . ; London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), p. 5.
See also
"Fifty Years of Military Aviation,' 1912-1962, " p. 8.
11.
Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson, "Memoran
dum on the Organization of the Air Services," cited in
Raleigh and Jones, Ap p e ndices, 1-8.
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The only method of overcoming the "present illogical situa
tion of divided responsibility in aeronautics/" said
Henderson,

was the formation of a "complete department and

a complete united service dealing with all operations in
the air,

and with all the accessory services which that

expression implies,"

A temporary loss of efficiency would

occur, but if the Government believed the war would last
until June,

1918,

the change should be made,

Henderson con-

eluded.12
Smuts had seen for himself the effect of the German
air raids on tbe morale of the people of London,
course of the hearings,

During the

he slowly came to the conclusion

that the new fighter squadrons and the anti-aircraft artil
lery were not a sufficient defense for the city.

An offen

sive air weapon was essential to carry the war to the heart
of Germany.

"We can only defend this island effectively

against air attacks by offensive measures,

by attacking the

enemy in his air bases on the Continent and in that way
destroying his power of attacking us across the C h a n n e l , "
he believed.

12.
13,
(New York:

13

Ibid.
J. C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts;
a Biography
Morrow, 1952), p. 193.
See also Hancock, p. 441.
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Smuts was reinforced in the conclusion that was grow
ing in his mind by letters such as the one he received from
Lord Milner during the hearings#
War Cabinet,

Milner,

a member of the

wrote:

Say what you like, the soldiers and sailors at the War
Office and Admiralty do not yet grasp the fact that
there is a new kind of warfare before us and that,
besides the help they have to give the army and navy,
the airmen will have to fight battles of their own.
On August 17,
had begun,
issued.

15

1917, barely six weeks after hearings

the document known as the Smuts Report was
In the 6,000-word report,

Smuts called for the

establishment of a separate air service with status equal to
that of the older services and with an independent ministry
in control.

The report criticized the way in which the

existing Air Board was constituted*

saying it was not

really effective because it functioned merely as a confer
ence.

Its main function was to fulfill the requirements of

war policy established by the Army and the Navy.

Subordina

tion of the air service could no longer be justified,

the

report said, because air power could be used as an

14.
Smuts, p. 192.
15.
Formally, the "Second Report of the Prime
Minister's Committee on Air Organization and Home Defence
Against Air Raids, dated 17th August 1917."
The complete
report is sometimes difficult to locate.
Because of this,
the entire document* as it appears in Raleigh and Jones,
A p p e n d i c e s , 8-14, is included as Appendix I.
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independent means of carrying on a war.

In fact,

the day was approaching when air operations,

said Smuts,

capable of

destroying enemy industry and population on a vast scale,
might well be the principle operations of war.
happened,

When this

the older forms of military and naval operations

would become

"secondary and subordinate."

16

With the "Surplus Aircraft Fleet" in mind,
pointed

out that while aircraft production

war had been insufficient for the needs of
that day appeared to be passing.

Smuts

throughout the
the Army and Navy,

Now, he wrote,

the program of aircraft production which the War Cabi
net has sanctioned for the following twelve months is
far in excels of Navy and Army requirements.
Next
spring and summer the position will be that the Army
and Navy will have all the Air Service required . . .
and over and above that there will be a great surplus
available. , . . Who is to look after and direct the
activities of this available surplus?
Neither the Army
nor the Navy is specially competent to do so; and for
that reason the creation of an Air Staff for planning
and directing independent air operations will soon be
pressing, ^
Looking to the future employment of this new air arm,
he said,

"It requires some imagination to realize that next

summer, while our Western Front may still be moving forward

16.
17.

Raleigh and Jones,
Ibid.

Appendices, 10.
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at a snail'a pace in Belgium and France,

the air battle-front

will be far behind on the Rhine.
The new force should be created.
combining the existing air services.

Smuts continued,

by

If the Army and Navy

should maintain their own special air services in addition
to the force under the Air Ministry,

it would

"make the con

fusion hopeless and render the solution of the air problem
impossible."

19

Smuts concluded by recommending that no

publicity be given the proposed change in order to deny intelligence of its nature to the enemy.

20

The report was sweeping and inclusive,
mendations were revolutionary.

and its recom

It met with divided opinion -

from both political and military leaders.

The War Cabinet

considered the report on August 24 and give it tentative
approval.

A new body,

mittee, was appointed.
direction,

known as the Air Organization Com
This Committee,

under S m u t s 's

was told to investigate the details of amalgamat

ing the existing air services and to draft the necessary
legislation.

I8 •
19.
20.
21.

I b i d ., p . 11,
I b i d ., p. 12.
I b i d ., p. 14.
Raleigh and Jones,

VI,

13.
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Appointment of the Air Organization Committee did not
mean that the War Cabinet fully supported S m u t s 's recommenda
tions.

The Admiralty,

First Sea Lord,

represented by the newly-appointed

Sir Eric Geddes, was dogmatically opposed

to any interference with tbe Royal Naval Air Service.
Geddes suggested that the new Air Ministry assume control of
the Royal Flying Corps and leave the Royal Naval Air Service
alone.

22

Balfour,

eign Affairs,
Lord,
War,

serving as Secretary of State for For

but true to his colors as a former First Sea

supported Geddes.

Derby,

the Secretary of State for

shifted back and forth from support to opposition.

Bonar Lew avoided the controversy, while Milner and Cowdray
both feared the dislocation to the war effort which would
occur if a separate force was formed.
Churchill,

Only Curzon and

the latter back in the Government as the Minister.

of Munitions,

fully supported S m u t s 's proposals.

The military leaders were also divided.
airmen,

The Naval

anxious to be free of the restrictive atmosphere of

the Admiralty,

pp.

23

supported the plan.

24

The leaders of the

22.
Lloyd George, XV, 122-23.
23.
Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London:
Collins,
230-31.
24.
The A e r o p l a n e , January 9, 1918, p. 172e.

1962),
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R. F. C, f with the notable exception of Henderson, were
almost all opposed to the single service.
Trenchard,

25

commanding the R. F. C. in France,

had

suffered for two years from chronic shortages of aircraft.
He attached the idea of the

"Surplus Aircraft Fleet" and

blames Henderson for letting Smuts believe such an increase
in production was possible.

"I thought," he wrote later,

"that if anything were done
Front#

. . .

the war would be lost#

service#

ditionary Force in France#

and there would be no air

O

united or divided.

to weaken the Western

Haig#

commanding the Expe

told the Cabinet that

more than three years of war#

"after

our armies are still very far

short of their requirements#

and my experience of repeated

failure to fulfill promises

. . . makes me somewhat skepti

cal as to the large surplus of machines on which the
committee counts."

27

25.
I b i d . See also Boyle# pp. 231-32.
26.
Trenchard later admitted that "Henderson had
twice the insight and understanding that I had.
He was
prepared to run risks rather than lose a chance which he
saw might never come again. . . .
It is doubtful whether
the R. A. F. or Britain realises its debt to him# which is
at least as great as its debt to S m u t s . " See Boyle# pp.
232-33.
27.
Raleigh and Jones# VI# 15.
See also The Private
Papers of Douglas Haig# 1914-19, ed. Robert Blake (London:
Eyre & Spottiswood# 1952)# p. 252.
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Despite the controversy,

the Air Organization Com

mittee continued planning the amalgamation of the two exist
ing air services.

David Henderson,

appointed by Smuts,

w a s the moving spirit behind the body.

A number of sub^-

committees under his guidance sought solutions to the myriad
problems of merging the two forces.

28

The controversy caused the War Cabinet to withhold
final approval of S m u t s 's recommendations throughout the
month of September despite new raids by the Gotha bombers.
No public announcement had been made of the Smuts proposals
and,

as a result,

criticism of the Government air policies

continued to increase.

When the W a r Cabinet met on Octo

ber 8, Smuts urged hloyd George to make a public statement
on the new air proposalssensitive to controversy,

The Prime Minister,
declined,

always

saying that the time

might not be right for the formation of a separate air
service.

29

With the issue at an impasse,

new and important

pressure was applied to the War Cabinet.

On October 10,

28.
Raleigh and Jones, VI, 13.
The other members
were Cowdray, Major J. D. Baird, M. P., Commodore G. M.
Paine, and Lord Hugh Cecil.
Major C. L. Storr and Sir Paul
Harvey were joint secretaries.
2 9 - I b i d ., VI, 18.
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Cowdray told Admiral Hark Kerr in strictest confidence that
the formation of the separate air service was in doubt.
Kerr,

a member of the Air Board, was a specialist in German

war production.

Recent studies had convinced him that

Germany wag giving the highest priority to production, of
aircraft and submarines, With the ultimate goal of bombing
an d starving England into submission.

Kerr immediately wrote

a memorandum to Cowdray for circulation to the War Cabinet.
In it, he marshaled evidence to show that Germany was con
centrating on production of submarines and large bombing
aircraft.

He wrote:

It is a race between them and us? every day lost is a
vital danger.
If the Germans get at us first, with
several hundred machines every night, each one carry
ing several tons of explosives, Woolwich, Chatham,
and all the factories in the London district will be
laid flat, part of London wiped out, and workshops in
the southeast of England will be destroyed, and
consequently our offensive on land, sea and air will
come to an e n d . ^
To halt this,

Kerr said,

the British must begin at

once to build a force to attack German production centers
and air fields.

This would require

big bombing machines as a minimum,
preparation of aerodromes,

"the building of 2,000
the training of pilots,

the building of sheds, manufacture

30.
Mark Kerr, Land Sea and Air
Green and Co., Ltd., 1927), pp. 289-91.

(London:

Longmans,
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of bombs,

collection of t r a n s p o r t . O n l y

a separate

Air Ministry could carry out this ambitious program,

Kerr

concluded.
Kerr's memorandum apparently had a decisive effect
on the members of the War Cabinet.
on October 15,

32

When they met again

they agreed to make a cautious announcement ...

in Parliament that a bill would be introduced providing "for
33
the eventual setting up of an Air- M i n i s t r y . "

At the

same time an Air Policy Committee was formed with Smuts as
chairman to advise the Cabinet on air matters,

pending the

establishment of an Air Ministry.
When Parliament convened on October 16,
the summer recess,
the air problem.

following

the members demanded immediate action on

34

As a result, when Bonar Law rose to make

the announcement agreed on by the War Cabinet, he irrevocably
committed the Government.

"A bill to constitute an Air

Ministry has been prepared and will shortly be introduced,"
he told the members.

35

After that,

there was no turning back.

When the bill was introduced on November 9,
a

it went to

Parliament far more receptive than the Prime Minister had

31.
Ibid.
32. Boyle, pp. 238-39.
33.
Raleigh and Jones, VI, 19.
34.
Ibid.
..
35.
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
XCVIII (1917), 27-28.
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/■

believed possible.

The Times noted that

"the House warmly

approved / t h e / argument that it was necessary to create an
authority whose exclusive duty should be to study and deal

-

37
with the general problems of war in the air. 11
Twenty days later,

following a quick and smooth p a s •30

sage,

the Air Force Bill received the royal assent.

Orders in Council were issued on December 21,
January 2, 1918,

1917,

°
and on

defining the composition and duties of the

members of the Air Council.

The second of these orders

specified that the Air Council should come into being on
January 3, 1918,
publisher,

and designated Lord Rothermere,

the first Secretary of State for Air.

of the Council included Henderson,
Trenchard#

sonnel;

Sefton Brancker,

39

Members

as Vice-President;

as Chief of the Air Staff; Kerr,

of the Air Staff; Godfrey Paine,

a newspaper

as Deputy Chief

as Master-General of Per

as Controller General of Equipment;

36.
Lloyd George, IV, 122-23.
See also Boyle, pp.
238-39; and Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
XCIX (1917), 126-183.
37.
The Times (London), November 13, 1917, p. 7.
38.
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
X CIX (1917), 2277.
39.
Rothermere had succeeded Cowdray as President of
the Air Board on November 17 following one of those curious
political anomalies of the Lloyd George administration.
On
November 16, a letter appeared in The Times over the signa
ture of Lord Northcliffe addressed to the Prime Minister,
declining appointment to the new post of Secretary of State
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Weir,

as Director-General of Aircraft Production in the

Ministry of Munitions;
Works and Buildings;

Sir John Hunter,

as Administrator of

and Major J. L. Baird,

Under-Secretary of State.

as Parliamentary

40

Passage of the Air Force Bill and establishment of
the Air Council was a tribute to the genius of Smuts and
to the doggedness and perseverance of David Henderson.
The decision of 1914 which had permitted the fledgling Royal
Flying Corps to be split asunder was reversed.
first unified military air service,

The world's

the Royal Air Force,

40

began its journey through new and uncharted skies.

for Air.
Cowdray, who had assumed that he would succeed to
that post as the incumbent Air Board president, resigned and
was replaced by Rothermere, N o r t h c l i f f e 's brother, and a
press lord in his own right.
40.
Raleigh and Jones, VI, 22.
41.
The initials R- A. F. had long stood for the
Royal Aircraft Factory.
C. G. Grey greeted the selection
of the new name for the combined air service as follows:
"At any rate now we know the worst.
The glory of the names.,
of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps,
w i t h their traditions of gallantry, chivalry, and selfsacrifice, are to be merged into initials which stand for
everything that has been bad in military Aeronautics."
The Aer o p l a n e , March 20, 1918, p. 1052.

CHAPTER VI

BEGINNING AND APPRAISAL

The Times greeted the birth of the Royal Air Force on
April 1, 1918, with an editorial hailing the opportunity fpr
"practiced flying men to use their expert knowledge."'*'
Before the month was out,

the leadership of the new service

was split by internal dissension,

and many of those

"prac

ticed flying men" had departed the Air Ministry.
The problems arose partly from the circumstances of
the R. A. F.'s birth.
public pressure#

The new service was the product of

ever increasingly applied to the national

political leadership.

Demands for a solution to the German

air raid problem forced the politicians to act.
they had created,

they meant to control.

Now, what

At that point the

political leadership--as represented by Lord Rothermere,

the

Secretary of State for Air-~ran head on into the iron-minded
expression of the military will in the person of General
Trepchard.

1.

The Times

(London),

April 1, 1918, p.
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2.
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The first ominous rumblings of the problems to come
were heard when Cowdray resigned as President of the Air
Board and was replaced by Rothermere.

Paced with the task

of carrying out the amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps
and the Royal Naval Air Service,

Rothermere asked that

Trenchard be recalled from France to serve as the first
Chief of Air Staff,

Trenchard resisted for a time, but

finally became convinced that he was the only senior air
officer who could solve the organizational problems.
January 18,

On

1918, he surrendered command of the R. F. C. in

France to Major General J. M. Salmond and returned home to
the Air Council.
the first,

2

It was a fateful decision.

Almost from

there was conflict between the taciturn,

incommu

nicative air leader and the garrulous press lord and politi^cian.

Trenchard was dogmatic and precise.

He was imbued

with the military traditions of the Army and demanded adher
ence to traditional procedures and strict compliance with the
chain of command in dealing with subordinates.
on the other hand,

Rothermere,

felt free to indulge his own ideas in the

2.
Boyle maintains that T r e n c h a r d 1s acceptance was
due to his desire to protect Haig.
Rothermere and Northcliffe
threatened to launch a press attack against Haig if Trenchard
did not accept the Air Council post.
Andrew Boyle, Trenchard
(London:
Collins, 1962), pp. 250-52.
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organization of the new service,,

When the Secretary insisted

on consulting subordinate members of the Air Staff without
bringing Trenchard into the discussions, the conflict boiled
over.

On March 19,

1918,

following an exchange of acrimon

ious correspondence between the two men,

Trenchard resigned.

The mighty German offensive launched against Haig's forces on
March 21 delayed the inevitable for a few weeks,

but on

April 13 the resignation was accepted, and Major General F. H.
Sykes was appointed to replace Trenchard as Chief of the Air
Staff.^
Sykes was the first commander of the Military Wing of
the R. F. C. in 1912.

When the war began, he went to France

as Henderson's Chief of Staff.
Henderson,

However,

after a dispute with

he was dismissed from that position.

When Sykes's

3*
I b i d ., pp. 265-76.
Lord Beaverbrook, a confidant
of many of the leading political figures at the time, claims
the dispute with Rothermere and T r e n c h a r d 1s eventual resig
nation were a part of the larger civil-military conflict
which involved Robertson, Haig, Jellicoe, and the Prime
Minister.
Beaverbrook claims that Lloyd George believed the
military leaders were conspiring with Asquith to replace him,
and that he accepted Trenchard's resignation to strengthen
his own hand.
Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power 1917-1918
(New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), p. 222.
Maurice
Hankey, the Secretary of the War Cabinet, disputes this.
"I was practically living with Lloyd George at this time.
. . . The Prime Minister was too engrossed in the life and
death problems of the moment to give much thought to the
tiresome Trenchard business, which is mentioned only three
times in my d i a r y . " Cited in Boyle, pp. 275-76.
Certainly
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appointment was announced,
dent of the Air C o u n c i l .

Henderson resigned as Vice-Presi
He wrote to Bonar Law that his

previous difficulty w i t h Sykes was no secret,

and he feared

that he might become the focus point of discontent within
the Air Ministry.

"I am ready to admit that I earnestly

desired to escape from the atmosphere of intrigue and false
hood which has enveloped the Air Ministry for the last few
m o n t h s , " he concluded-

4

The resignations fed to a spirited attack in the
press which centered on Lord Rothermere.

5

Mounting criti

cism in Parliament seemed certain to lead to an inquiry,
and in the face of this Rothermere sent his resignation to
the Prime Minister and retired to his country home.

When

the resignation was announced on April 25, passersby were

T r e n c h a r d 's well-known political naivetd makes it unlikely
that he would have taken part in any military junta seeking
to overthrow the Prime Minister.
For more on the civilmilitary dispute, a fascinating topic in itself, see Robert
Blake, Unrepentant Tory (New York:
St. Martin's Press Inc.,
1956), p. 368, and The Private Papers of Douglas H a i g ,
1914-19 (London;
Eyre & Spottiswood, 1952), p. 51, edited
by the same author.
4.
Cited in Beaverbrook, p. 378.
5.
"The list is sts'adily growing, " wrote the Daily
News "of acknowledged masters of their craft for whose ser
vices in the crisis of our fate the government has no
serious use.
It is the story in every element.
Thus:
The
Sea, Lord Jellicoe.
The Land, Sir W. Robertson.
The Air,
Sir Hugh T r e n c h a r d . " Cited in Beaverbrook, pp. 225-26.
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startled to see R. A. F. officers leaning from the windows
of the Hotel Cecil, waving newspapers and cheering.
is it, a victory in France?" someone shouted.
at h o m e , " a reveller at a window answered.

"What

"No,

a victory

"Lord Rothermere

6
has g o n e . "
A few days later Sir Henry Norman,

an additional

member of the Air Council appointed by Rothermere,
resigned.

also

There the disintegration stopped.

As the w a r continued through the summer of 1918,
Trenchard returned to command the Independent Air Force,

the

organization formed specifically to carry the war to the
industrial heartland of Germany through the air.
plan for the Independent Air Force,

Under the

all heavy bombers in

France were withdrawn from the Squadrons of the R. A. F.
operating with the Army,
located at Ochey.

and were formed into new units and

The new organization was under the direct

control of the Air Ministry in London.

The Commander was to

carry out bombing attacks against German cities without
reference to the land war or to General Salmond,

the R. A. F.

commander in France whose activities were still linked
directly to the fortunes of the Army and the ground war.

6.

Boyle, p. 281.

7.

Ibid., pp. 288-96.

7
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The Independent Air Force was,

then,

in theory,

the long-

sought vehicle to move the war out of the trenches and into
Germany.

It was the agency which wpuld employ the Surplus

Aircraft Fleet which Cowdrey and Weir had forecast,
h a d influenced Smuts so greatly.

and which

It was the force which

Mark Kerr had called for in his historic memorandum to the
War Cabineto

This organization,

ideally, was the culmina

t i o n of the protracted debate over air power which had con
tinued throughout the war„
The official historian pinpointed the ultimate goal
of the Independent Air Force and summarized the aspirations
of those who fought for speedier development of the independ
ent air weapon when he said that

"no people on earth . » .

can maintain the efficiency of its war activities under the
regular intensive bombing of its centres of population."

O

In five months of operation before the end of the
war,

the Independent Air Force dropped 550 tons of bombs

b e h i n d enemy lineso^

At the Armistice,

it had nine squad

rons operating against German industrial centers and air

Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in the Air
(6 volSp and appendices? Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1928-37)
I, 489.
9.
"Fifty Years of Military Aviation, 1912-1962," a
Chronology published b y the Air Ministry (London:
1962),
p. 7.
80
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fields.

But it had barely begun the operation for which it

was c o n c e i v e d . L l o y d

George noted that

"had the war p e r 

sisted a few months longer, we should have hurled ruin from
the air on to the chief cities of Central Europe.
And what of S m u t s 's role in all this?

1
(H

Was his the

correct solution to the air policy controversy?

Formation

of the Royal Air Force resulted from a political/
tary,
power

decision.

not a m i l i 

The decision was made by the Government in

in response fo intensive public pressure.

was the result of constant attacks

The pressure

on the Government's

air

policies and the German air raids which had shaken the
civilian population.

But S m u t s 's decision was not merely a

political expedient.

It seems certain that this man with

the keen,

perceptive mind became fully convinced that to

carry the war through the air to the German heartland was
t h e .one way to break the deadlock of the trenches.

12

His-

acceptance of the Surplus Aircraft Fleet figures produced by
Cowdray and Weir has been criticized,

13

but there is no cer-

10.
J. A, Chamier, The Birth of the Royal Air Force
(London:
Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1943), p. 172.
11.
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd
George (6 vols.; Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1933-37),
IV, 103.
12.
A b o v e , p . 70.
13.
Above, p. 75.
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tain evidence that he would not have made the same decision
even had these figures not been available.

Although the

ambitious production estimates were not met immediately,

by

the end of the war the Royal Air Force was the strongest m i l 
itary air service in the world.

It owned over 22,000 air

craft and maintained 133 squadrons and 15 flights overseas
and 55 squadrons at home.

Nearly 300,000 men and women were

entitled to wear the new blue uniform.

14

But Smuts was not alone in his vision.
1915 the need to carry the war to the enemy,

From early
to use the air

as a strategic medium to break away from the stagnated
battles of the trenches,

had been recognized.

called the Father of the Royal Air Force

15

Smuts has been

■and eulogized as

the founder of the basic concepts of air strategy above the
Italian,

Guilio Douhet?

Trenchard.

16

the American,

Billy Mitchell,

Certainly his contribution was major.

and
But

the honor--particularly that of Father of the Royal Air
Force— must be shared with many others.
advocates,

14.

Lord Beaulieu,

There were the early

the erratic Pemberton-Billing,

"Fifty Years of Military Aviation,

and

1912-1962,"

p. 8.
York:

15.
Lloyd George, IV, 124.
16.
E. J. Kingston-McGloughry, Global Strategy
Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 216.

(New
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even the cantankerous C. G. Grey, whose constant attacks
forced the Government to recognize the crippling competition
for material and the uncoordinated production effort which
hampered the development of the air weapon.

There was

Murray Sueter, whose war-long goal was to be free of the
restrictions placed on the air arm by the Admiralty;
Mark Kerr,

and

another Naval airman whose important memorandum

at the critical moment had such grreat influence on the War
Cabinet's decision tp seek an Air Ministry.

There were the

young commahders and pilots of the R. F. C. and R. N. A. S.*
who,

in four years of war,

progressed from complete ignor

ance of air warfare to a shrewd understanding of the principles of the air battle.
General David Henderson,

17

And there was,

finally,

without whose guidance and counsel

Smuts might never have reached his decision.
Henderson's role was that of the military expert
furnishing his own unique knowledge to the political lead
ers.

As a military officer,

subordinate to civil authority,

he could not go further in urging an independent air arm
than his important memorandum to Smuts.

1963),

17.
Sholto Douglas,
p. 13.

In this, he

Years of Combat

(London:

Collins,
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followed the traditional role of the military professional
in a democratic society.

Had he done otherwise,

Henderson

might well rank with Smuts as the Father of the Royal Air
Force.

Even Trenchard,

who during the war criticized much

that Henderson did in England,

acknowledged the debt which

the R. A. F. and the British people owe to this man.

18

That the decision made by Smuts and endorsed by the
Government was the correct one cannot now be doubted.

The

military service which grew out of the political decision
continued its part in carrying the long war to eventual
victory.

It survived post-war attacks b y economy-minded

men with no foresight and little hindsight.

Twenty-two

t

years later it stood as the only bulwark between the island
nation and a rejuvenated enemy bent once again on destroy
ing England from the air.
stood alone,

And finally,

the Royal Air Force

victorious in the Battle of Britain,

and a proud

monument to those men who fought for its birth in another
time and in another war.

18.

Above,

p. 75, n. 26.

APPENDIX I

THE SMUTS REPORT1

(Second Report of the Prime Minister's Committee on
Air Organization and Home Defence Against Air Raids
dated 17th August 1917)
1.
The War Cabinet at their 181st Meeting, held on
11th July 1917, decided-'That the Prime Minister and General Smuts, in
'consultation with representatives of the Admiralty, General
'Staff and FieId-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Home Forces,
'with such other experts as they may desire, should examine—
'(1) The defence arrangements for Home Defence
against air raids *
'(2) The air organization generally and the direc'tion of aerial operations.'
2.
Our first report dealt with the defences of the~
London area against air raids.
The recommendations in that
report were approved by the War Cabinet and are now in
process of being carried out.
The Army Council have placed
at Lord French's disposal the services of General Ashmore
to work out schemes of air defence for this area.
We p r o 
ceed to deal in this report with the Second Term of Reference:
the air organization generally and the direction of aerial
operations.
For the considerations which will appear in the
course of this roport we consider the early settlement of
this matter of vital importance to the successful prosecution
of the war.
The three most important questions, which press
for an early answer, are:
(1) Shall there be instituted a real Air Ministry
responsible for all air organization and opera
tions?

1.
Cited in Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, War in
the Air (6 vols. and appendices,* Oxford:
Clarendon Press,
1922-37), A p p e n d i c e s , 8-14.
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(2) Shall there be constituted a unified Air Ser
vice embracing both the present Royal Naval AirService and Royal Flying Corps?
And if this
second question is answered in the affirmative,
the third question arises-(3) How shall the relations of the new Air Service
to the Navy and the Army be determined so that
the functions at present discharged for them by
the Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Flying
Corps, respectively, shall continue to be effi
ciently performed by the new Air Service?
3.
The subject of general air organization has in
the past formed the subject of acute controversies which are
now, in consequence of the march of events, largely obsolete,
and to which a brief reference is here made only in so far
as they bear on some of the difficulties which we have to
consider in this report.
During the initial stages of air
development, and while the role to be performed by an Air
Service appeared likely to be merely ancillary to naval and
military operations, claims were put forward and pressed
with no small warmth, for separate Air Services in connexion
w ith the two old-established War Services.
These claims
eventuated in the establishment of the Royal Naval Aircraft
Service and Royal Flying Corps, organized and operating on
separate lines in connexion with and under the aegis of
the Navy and Army respectively, and provision for their
necessary supplies and requirements was made separately by
the Admiralty and War Office and to provide a safeguard
against the competition, friction, and waste which were
liable to arise, an Air Committee was instituted to preserve
the peace and secure co-operation if possible.
When war
broke out this body ceased to exist, owing to the fact that
its Chairman and members nearly all went to the front, but
after a time it was replaced b y the Joint War Air Committee.
The career of this body was, however, cut short by an absence
of all real power and authority and by political controver
sies which arose in consequence.
It was followed by the
present Air Board, which has a fairly well-defined status
and has done admirable work, especially in settling type
and patterns of engines and machines and in coordinating
and controlling supplies to both the Royal Naval Air Service
and Royal Flying Corps.
4.
The utility of the Air Board is, however, severely
limited by its constitution and powers.
It is not really a
Board, but merely a Conference.
Its membership consists
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almost entirely of representatives of the War Office,
Admiralty, and Ministry of Munitions, who consult with each
other in respect of the claims of the Royal Naval Air Ser
vice and Royal Flying Corps for their supplies.
It has no
technical personnel of its own to advise it, and it is depen
dent on the officers which the departments just mentioned
place at its disposal for the performance of its duties.
These officers, especially the Director-General of Military
Aeronautics, are also responsible for the training of the
personnel of the Royal Flying Corps Service.
Its scope is
still further limited in that it has nothing to do either
with the training of the personnel of the Royal Naval Air
Service or with the supply of lighter-than-air craft, both of
which the Admiralty has jealously retained as its special
perquisites.
Although it has a nominal authority to discuss
questions of policy, it has no real power to do so, because
it has not the independent technical personnel to advise it
in that respect, and any discussion of policy would simply
ventilate the views of its military and naval members.
Under
the present constitution and powers of the Air Board, the
real directors of war policy are the Army and Navy, and to
the Air Board is really allotted the minor role of fulfill
ing their requirements according to their ideas of war
policy.
Essentially the Air Service is as subordinated to
military and naval direction and conceptions of policy as
the artillery is, and, as long as that state of affairs
lasts, it is useless for the Air Board to embark on a policy
of its own, which it could neither originate nor execute
under present conditions.
5.
The time is, however, rapidly approaching when
that subordination of the Air Board and the Air Service could
no longer be justified.
Essentially the position of an Air
service is quite different from that of the artillery arm,
to pursue our comparison; artillery could never be
used in
war except as a weapon in military or naval or air opera
tions.
It is a weapon, an instrument ancillary to a ser
vice, but could not be an independent service itself.
Air
service on the contrary can be used as an independent means
of war opera t i o n s . Nobody that witnessed the attack on
London on 11th July could have any doubt on that point.
Unlike artillery an air fleet can conduct extensive opera
tions far from, and independently of, both Army and Navy.
As far as can at present be foreseen there is absolutely no
limit to the scale of its future independent war use.
And
the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their
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devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and
populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal
operations of war, to which the older forms of military and
naval operations ma y become secondary and subordinate.■ The
subjection of the Air Board and service could only be justi
fied on the score of their infancy. But that is a disability
which time can remove, and in this respect the march of
events has been very rapid during the war.
In our opinion
there is no reason why the Air Board should any longer con
tinue in its present form as practically no more than a con
ference room between the older services, and there is every
reason why it should be raised to the status of an indepen
dent Ministry in control of its own war service„
6.
The urgency for the change will appear from the
following facts.
Hitherto aircraft production has been insuf
ficient to supply the demands of both Army and Navy, and the
chief concern of the Air Board has been to satisfy the neces
sary requirements of those services c But that phase is
rapidly passing.
The programme of aircraft production which
the War Cabinet has sanctioned for the following twelve
months is far in excess of Navy and Army requirements.
Next
spring and summer the position will be that the Army and Navy
will have all the Air Service required in connexion with
their operations; and over and above that there will be a
great surplus available for independent operations.
Who' is
to look after and direct the activities of this available
surplus?
Neither the Army nor the Navy is specially compe
tent to do so; and for that reason the creation of an Air
Staff for planning and directing independent air operations
will soon be pressing.
More than that:
the surplus of
engines and machines now being built should have regard to
the strategical purpose to which they are going to be put.
And in settling in advance the types to be built the opera
tions for which they are intended apart from naval or m i l i 
tary use should be clearly kept in view.
This means that
the Air Board has already reached the stage where the settle
ment of future war policy in the air war has become neces
sary.
Otherwise engines and machines useless for independent
strategical operations may be built.
The necessity for an
Air Ministry and Air Staff has therefore become urgent.
7.
The magnitude and significance of the transforma
tion now in progress are not easily realized.
It requires
some imagination to realize that next summer, while our
Western Front may still be moving forward at a snail's pace
in Belgium and France, the air battle-front will be far
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behind on the Rhine, and that its continuous and intense
pressure against the chief industrial centres of the enemy
as well as on his lines of communication may form an impor
tant factor in bringing about peace.
The enemy is no doubt
making vast plans to deal with us in London if we do not
succeed in beating him in the air and carrying the war into
the heart of his country.
The questions of machines, aero
dromes, routes, and distances, as well as nature and scope
of operations require careful thinking out in advance, and
in proportion to our foresight and preparations will our
success be in these new and far-reaching developments.
Or
take again the case of a subsidiary theatre; there is no
reason why we may not gain such an over-powering air super
iority in Palestine as to cut the enemy's precarious and
limited railways communications, prevent the massing of
superior numbers against our advance, and finally to wrest
victory and peace from him.
But careful staff work in ad
vance is here in this terra incognita of the air even more
essential than in ordinary military and naval operations
which follow a routine consecrated by the experience of cen
turies of warfare on the old lines.
The progressive exhaustion of the man-power of the
combatant nations will more and more determine the character
of this war as one of arms and machinery rather than of men.
And the side that commands industrial superiority and
exploits its advantages in that regard to the utmost ought
in the long run to win.
Man-power in its war use will more
and more tend to become subsidiary and auxiliary to the full
development and use of mechanical power.
The submarine has
already shown what startling developments are possible in
naval warfare.
Aircraft is destined to work an even more
far-reaching change in land warfare.
But to secure the
advantages of this new factor for our side we must not only
make unlimited use of the mechanical genius and productive
capacity of ourselves and our American allies, we must
create the new directing organization, the new Ministry and
Air Staff which could properly handle this new instrument
of offence, and equip it with the best brains at our dis
posal for the purpose.
The task of planning the new Air
Service organization and thinking out and preparing for
schemes of aerial operations next summer must tax our air
experts to the utmost and no time should be lost in setting
the new Ministry and Staff going.
Unless this is done we
shall not only lose the great advantages which the new form
of warfare promises but we shall end in chaos and confusion,
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as neither the Army ox Navy nor the Air Board in its present
form could possibly cope w i t h 'the vast developments involved
in our new aircraft programme.
Hitherto the creation of an
Air Ministry and Air Service has been looked upon as an
idea to be kept in view but not to be realized during this
war.
Events have, however, moved so rapidly, our prospec
tive aircraft production will soon be so great, and the
possibilities of aerial warfare have grown so far beyond
all previous expectations, that the change will brook no
further delay, and will have to be carried through as soon
as all the necessary arrangements for the purpose can be _
made.
8.
There remains the question of the new Air Ser
vice and the absorption of fhe Royal Naval Air Service and
Royal Flying Corps into it*
Should the Navy and the Army
retain their own special Air Services in addition to the air
forces which will be controlled by the Air Ministry?
This
will make the qonfusion hopeless and render the solution of
the air problem impossible.
The maintenance of three Air
Services is out of the question, nor indeed does the War
Office make any claims to a separate Air Service of its
own.
But, as regards air work, the Navy is exactly in the
same position as the Army; the intimacy between aerial scout
ing or observation and naval operations is not greater than
that between long-range artillery work on land and aerial
observation or spotting.
If a separate Air Service is not
necessary in the one case, neither is it necessary in the
other.
And the proper and, indeed, only possible arrange
ment is to establish one unified Air Service, which will
absorb both the existing services under arrangements which
will fully safeguard the efficiency and secure the closest
intimacy between the Army and the Navy and the portions of
the Air Service allotted or seconded to them.
9.
To secure efficiency and smooth working of the
Air Service in connexion with naval and military operations,
it is not only necessary that in the construction of air
craft and the training of the Air personnel the closest
attention shall be given to the special requirement of the
Navy and the Army.
It is necessary also that all Air units
detailed for naval or military work should be temporarily
seconded to those services, and come directly under the
orders of the naval or army commanders of the forces with
which they are associated.
The effect of that will be that
in actual working practically no change will be made in the
air work as it is conducted to-day, and no friction could
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arise between the Navy or Army commands and the Air Service
allotted to them®
It is recognized, however, that for some years to
come the Air Service will, for its efficiency, be largely
dependent on the officers of the Navy and Army who are
already employed in this work, or who may in the future
elect to join it permanently or temporarily*
The influence
of the Regular officers of both services on the spirit,
conduct, and discipline of the present air forces has been
most valuable, and it is desirable that the Air Board should
still be able to draw on the older services for the assis
tance of trained leaders and administrators.
Further, it is
equally necessary that a considerable number of officers
of both Navy and Army should be attached for a part of their
service to the Air Service in order that naval and military
commanders and Staff Officers may be trained in the new arm
and able to utilize to advantage the contingents of the air
forces which will be put at their disposal.
The organization
of the ait force therefore should be such as to allow of the
seconding of officers of the Navy and Army for definite
periods-^not less than four or five years--to the Air Ser
vice.
Such officers would naturally after their first
training be chiefly employed with the naval and military
contingents in order to secure close co-operation in air
work with their own services.
In similar fashion it would
be desirable to arrange for the transfer of expert warrant
and petty or non-commissioned officers from the Navy and Army
to the new Service.
10.
To summarize the above discussion we would make
the following recommendations g
(1) That an Air Ministry be. instituted as soon as
possible, consisting of a Minister with a consul
tative Board on the lines of the Army Council or
Admiralty Board, on which the several depart
mental activities of the Ministry will be repre
sented.
This Ministry to control and administer
all matters in connexion with aerial warfare of
all kinds whatsoever, including lighter-than-air
as well as heavier-than-air craft.
(2) That under the Air Ministry an Air Staff be
instituted on the lines of the Imperial General
Staff responsible for the working out of war
plans, the direction of operations, the collec
tion of intelligence, and the training of the air
personnel; that this Staff be equipped with the
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(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

©

best brains and practical experience available
in our present Air Services, and that by period
ical appointment to the Staff of officers with
great practical experience from the front, due
provision be made for the development of the
Staff in response to the rapid advance of this
new service*
That the Air Ministry and Staff proceed to work
out the arrangements necessary for the amalgama
tion of the Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Fly
ing Corps and the legal constitution and dis
cipline of the new Air Service, and to prepare
the necessary draft legislation and regulations,
which could be passed and brought into opera
tion next autumn and w i n t e r .
That the arrangements referred to shall make
provision for tbe automatic passing of the Royal
Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps per
sonnel to the new Air Service, by consent, with
the option to those officers and other ranks who
are merely seconded or lent# of reverting to their
former positions.
There are legal questions involved in this
transfer# and the rights of officers and men must
be protected, but no dislocation need be anti
cipated,
That the Air Service remain in intimate touch
with the Army and Navy by the closest liaison, or
by direct representation of both on the Air
Staff# and that, if necessary, the arrangements
for close co-operation between the three Services
be revised from time to time.
That the Air Staff shall, from time to time,
attach to the Army and the Navy the air units
necessary for naval or military operations, and
such units shall# during the period of such attach
ment, be subject, for the purpose of operations,
to the control of the respective naval and m i li
tary commands.
Air Units not so attached to the
Army and Navy shall operate under the immediate
direction of the Air Staff.
The air units attached to the Navy and Army
shall be provided with the types of machines
which these services respectively desire.

99

(7) That provision he made for the seconding or loan
of Regular officers of the Navy and Army to the
Air Service for definite periods, such officers
to he employed, as far as possible, with the
naval and military contingents.
(8) That provision be made for the permanent transfer
hy desire, of officers and other ranks from the
Navy and Army to the Air Services.
11,
In conclusion, we would point out how undesirable
it would he to give too much publicity to the magnitude of
our air construction programme and the real significance of
the changes in organization now proposed.
It is important
for the winning of the war that we should not only secure
air predominance, hut secure it on a very large scale; and
having secured it in this war we should make every effort
and sacrifice to maintain it for the future.
Air supremacy
may in the long run become as important a factor in the
defence of the Empire ae sea supremacy.
From both these
points of view it is necessary that not too much publicity
be given to o u f plana and intentions which will only have
the effect of spurring our opponents to corresponding
efforts,
^he necessary measures should be defended on the
grounds of their inherent ^hd obvious reasonableness and
utility, and the desirability of preventing conflict and
securing harmony between naval and military requirements.
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